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Bureaucracy and Modernity: A Comparative Qualitative Analysis of Public Administration in the West and OIC States

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ABSTRACT: *Many of the 57 Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) states have been unsuccessful at incorporating modern bureaucracy into their political systems. While much of the Islamic world, particularly the Gulf States, have vast resources and oil wealth, they have had problems properly administering benefits in a way that is fair and beneficial to their citizens. Recurring themes can be readily identified in the literature on bureaucracy in Islamic states today: corruption, nepotism, and incompetence. Each particular state has its own unique circumstances surrounding modernization and bureaucratic development. The essay looks first at the development of bureaucratic theory in the West. It then addresses the theoretical question as to the compatibility of Western bureaucracy to Islamic states. The essay's final part examines and compares a few particular Islamic states in Central and South Asia as well as the Gulf States and the Middle East and North Africa.*

Introduction

As the twentieth century progressed, it became evident that bureaucracies and public administration would be absolutely essential in the west. Following the Great Depression, Franklin Roosevelt incorporated the largest expansion of administrative power and capacities the United States had ever seen. In an effort to combat high unemployment and underdevelopment, Roosevelt implemented numerous bold programs. The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), and the WPA (Works Progress Administration) were all examples of organized, well-funded governmental efforts to modernize the underdeveloped infrastructure of the United States and put unemployed Americans back to work (Kennedy, 1999; Smith, 2005). At the heart of these massive, state-sponsored projects was a re-conceptualization of the role of the bureaucracy.

The Islamic world today finds itself in a similar position in which the United States found itself during the Great Depression. Islamic states today are experiencing high unemployment, economic stagnation, and increasing political strife. Inadequate implementation of modern technology, corruption, nepotism, cronyism, gender discrimination, and general incompetence on the part of unqualified and under-trained administrators are all problems with public administration in member states of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) (Jreisat,

2009; Ayubi, 1989; Common, 2008). Bureaucratic modernization must be at the forefront of transforming the Muslim world. This paper first looks at the development of bureaucratic theory in the west. It then addresses the theoretical question as to the compatibility of western bureaucracy to Islamic states in general. The final part of this paper will examine and compare a few particular Islamic states in South Asia, the Gulf States, and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and bureaucracies in the West and Islamic States.

The Development of Bureaucratic Theory and the West: The Modern Beginnings

Perhaps the most prolific and well-known theorist on bureaucracy is the great German sociologist Max Weber. Weber (1964) argued that the future of the world would not necessarily result in global Communism, as envisioned by Marx, nor any other particular political ideology. He did argue that what was certain was that the future would be marked by expanding networks of formal rules and procedures and along with it, expanding bureaucratic institutions with greater and greater power. When considering the broader philosophical issue of where a state's authority is derived, Weber contests that authority comes from three sources. He defines these sources as traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal. As

societies become more developed, rational legal authority becomes more formalized. Weber's argument is that *the bureaucracy* is the embodiment of rational-legalistic authority. On bureaucracies and vertical hierarchical organization, Weber (1964) states:

The principle of office hierarchy and of the successive stages of appeal requires a clearly ordered system of authority and subordination involving supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones; a system which simultaneously accords the governed the possibility of appealing, in a regulated fashion, the finding of a lower agency to the corresponding superior agency. (p. 60)

Bureaucracies operate within the framework of codified written laws that can be referred to for clarification of procedures. Weber argues that a bureaucracy is a formal organization that is rule bound. Each individual has a specific function within the bureaucracy. Offices are organized hierarchically. Rules are technical; workers are separate and distinct from other officials. Administrative acts are formally written and distinguished, and issues pertaining to legal authority can be adjudicated by different agencies within the organization itself (Weber, 1964). This is to say, if one has a grievance, there is a formal procedure and body that exists for adjudicating their grievance. This also means that individuals cannot act on their own accord when deciding procedures. A well-organized bureaucracy can help with the flow of government and can cut down on violence based on resentment resulting from arbitrary enforcement of the laws. The notion of fairness is emphasized and embodied within the confines of a well-functioning bureaucracy.

The work of Herbert Simon looks at the decision-making process and how decisions are made in large organizations. Efficiency and practicality should be goals of any administrative decision (Simon, 1997). Chester Barnard, like Simon, argues that the way individuals make decisions should be and generally is qualitatively different from how administrative agencies make decisions. According to Barnard (1938), "the decisions that an individual makes as a member of an organization are quite distinct from his personal decisions" (p. 77). Other than the obviously different scope of personal and administrative decisions, the necessity of rationality is absolutely essential in any and every administrative decision in a way that it is not always the case in personal decisions. To give a crude but to the point example, one can decide to eat chocolate ice cream as opposed to vanilla for no particularly rational reason; maybe one had a taste for

it, or maybe it was on sale at the grocery store. Regardless of one's reason for choosing the particular flavor they did, the consequences of the decision to eat chocolate ice cream will most likely have minimal consequences or long term ramifications.

Bureaucratic decisions must always have a reason behind them. The most seemingly benign administrative decision could impact a very large number of people and could have long-lasting ramifications. Effective bureaucracies and public administrative agencies follow rational patterns of decision making. Paraphrasing Simon (1997) on page 66 of *Administrative Behavior*, rational decision-making in the administrative arena includes considerations of the following:

1. Responsibility to democratic institutions in guiding value determinations
2. Allocating resources based on relative importance of factual and ethical issues involved
3. Considering factual evidence and alternatives that could be more effective
4. Administrators being accountable for all value judgments, major or minor

The effective administrative agency or administrator is one who can keep these four broad guidelines in mind when making decisions. Opportunity costs factor into any administrative decision. Any particular choice x , will limit the possibility of enacting choice y and choice z . Utilizing such a set of protocols helps make the decision-making process more nuanced. As Simon (1997) notes, there is no one particular way to make a decision regarding often complex rules or regulations. The best way to approach the decision-making process at the organizational level is to go into the process with some type of consistent approach or basic questions that can be applied to as many decisions as possible.

Simon also addresses the question and role of authority in organizations. Simon (1997) defines authority, "not in terms of the sanctions of the superior, but in terms of the behaviors of the subordinate" (p. 183). This is a behavioral approach to understanding the exercise of authority. A way to measure one's authority is to examine the things those who are subordinate do. Greater authority means getting more people to more frequently behave in the way the superior desires. The authority of a particular individual or particular sub-agency within a larger agency has an enormous impact on the formal structure of any organization (Simon, 1997). Sometimes authority is derived directly from one's title. Being CEO or Senior Ex-

ective of any agency automatically carries with it some power. Authority can also be derived from charismatic sources. One's own experience within a particular organization can also be a source of authority. Effective leaders are able to get obedience from those below and support from those who are important.

The function and role of bureaucracy in the west has been well-studied by scholars for well over one hundred years. According to Wilson (1887), on the goal of the study of administration, "It is the object of administrative study to discover, first, what government can properly and successfully do, and, secondly, how it can do these proper things with the utmost possible efficiency and at the least possible cost either of money or energy" (p. 1). Wilson sought to incorporate studies of government with studies of bureaucracy and public administration. For Wilson, the two were becoming increasingly intertwined as the United States grew territorially and economically. In order to effectively administer an increasingly powerful empire, Wilson felt that political scientists needed to include bureaucracy as a part of their research program. Wilson (1887) sought to make bureaucracy function in a more business-like manner:

This is why there should be a science of administration which shall seek to strengthen the paths of government, to make its business less unbusinesslike, to strengthen and purify its organization, and to crown its duties with dutifulness. This is one reason why there is such a science.

(p. 201)

Wilson sought to shape the development of modern bureaucracy in a similar way to the functioning of an efficient large corporation.

New Models of Public Administration: the 1980s and Beyond

Over the last thirty years, there have been advances in the theorizing of public administration. *New Public Management* was perhaps the most popular model of administration for those who focused on the primacy of management in the 1980s and 1990s. In the twenty-first century, specifically following the events of 9/11, a new approach to management was introduced called Digital Era Governance (DEG).

New Public Management (NPM) has sought to emphasize improvements in service quality, and employee empowerment (Kaboolian, 1998; Jriesat, 1999). The

thrust of NPM is that deregulation is the best route to improve administration. It also seeks to increase competition amongst bureaucratic agencies by breaking them down into smaller competing parts. The argument is that competition between agencies will improve overall productivity. The peak of this theory about management occurred during the 1980s and 1990s when deregulation was popular amongst reformers of government agencies. Many proponents of NPM support neo-liberal market values and come from business schools.

Following catastrophic security failures, such as 9/11, and regulatory failures of financial markets, some theorists argue that NPM theories need to be reconsidered (Bastow, Dunleavy, Margetts, & Tinkler, 2006). They have been replaced by a new approach called *digital era governance*. These theorists contest that NPM theories insistence on fragmented, competing agencies has led to breakdown in communication amongst agencies and has facilitated in making corruption easier and accountability more difficult. The approaches towards management of DEG focus on reintegrating government integration and maximizing digitization (Bastow et al., 2006). Modern information technologies are critical to DEG approaches to government agency reform and improvement. This newest model also places new emphasis on the emerging field of cyber security. Administrative agencies must be alert and responsive to cyber terrorism and the theft of confidential information. Islamic states should consider both of these theoretical developments in public administration theory when improving their own bureaucracies.

Bureaucracy and Islam

At least in principle, the west has been effective at the implementation of bureaucracy and formal procedures. Despite all of the internal problems with large scale bureaucracies like the TVA, such bureaucratic programs did manage to modernize the vastly underdeveloped southeastern part of the United States. Before getting to the specific individual cases, one must first address the larger theoretical question about the compatibility of Islam with bureaucratic procedures. Can Islamic states have modern bureaucratic apparatuses and still be Islamic? Is bureaucracy a necessarily secular phenomenon? Evidence shows that Islam and bureaucracy are by no means mutually exclusive.

Islamic states absolutely must consider the importance of a well-developed and functioning bureaucracy.

Scholars who study public administration in Arab States recognize the need for administrative reform in these regions. There is a relation between economic prosperity and effective administration. According to Jamil Jreizat (1999), "Links between economic growth and administrative reform are universally acknowledged" (p.20). He goes on to argue that competent decision making and professional public service are prerequisites to any significant progress in regards to development and modernization.

The Iranian Revolution was a major blow to modern bureaucratic development in Islamic states. Despite the political and economic corruption under Shah Palavhi, efforts to develop modern bureaucratic procedures and administration in Iran were all but destroyed following the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Imam Khomeini (1970) was quite hostile to the concept of bureaucracy when he crafted his model of the state. In his words, "In addition, superfluous bureaucracies and the system of file-keeping and paper-shuffling that is enforced in them, all of which are totally alien to Islam, impose further expenditures on our national budget not less in quantity than the illicit expenditures of the first category" (Khomeini, 1970, p. 31). He goes on to say, "These superfluous formalities, which cause our people nothing but expense, trouble, and delay, have no place in Islam" (Khomeini, 1970, p. 31). For Khomeini, bureaucracy was a product of westernization and was not to be a part of his new model of an Islamic state. This meant that a very select few wielded a great deal of power and influence in Khomeini's system. As the late dissident cleric, Ayatollah Montazeri (2000) later argues, these particular jurists, while being well-read in religious law, were not qualified to handle bureaucratic matters.

Despite Khomeini's rhetoric, bureaucracy has had a long history within the Islamic framework. The keeping of records and written documentation of law is critical in any functioning state. Imam Khomeini's contestation that bureaucracies and their superfluous formalities have no place in Islam is not correct, and history proves this point. The formalities that are inherent in an effective functioning bureaucracy are quite compatible with an Islamic framework. According to historian Albert Hourani (1991), bureaucracy was integral to the functioning of the Ottoman Empire. "The Empire was a bureaucratic state, holding different regions within a single administrative and fiscal system" (Hourani, 1991, p.207). He goes on to argue that Turkish was established as the specific administrative vernacular. Many of the administrators were converts from all over the empire. Not only did the bureaucracy link the economic and political elements

of the empire, but it also connected the people of varying tribes and cultural backgrounds.

The importance of bureaucracy in the Islamic world even pre-dates the Ottoman Empire. Ibn Khaldun wrote nearly two hundred years prior to the Ottoman Empire at a time when the vast majority of the people were illiterate. In regard to the *positions of the pen*, Ibn Khaldun (2005) states:

Each of the instruments through which help may be given has many different subdivisions. "The pen" has such subdivisions, for instance, as 'the pen of letters and correspondence', 'the pen of diplomas and fiefs', and 'the pen of bookkeeping,' which means the offices of chief of tax collections and allowance and of minister of the army.

(p.189)

The need for written records has always been important. In reality, what is the Qur'an other than a written account of the decrees and commands of God? Ibn Khaldun (2005) argues throughout *The Muqaddimah*, written in 1377, that when an empire begins to enter into a stage of decline, often the bureaucracy becomes corrupt. The ruler becomes increasingly despotic, arrogant, and less just (Khaldun, 2005). This leads to a centralization of power and increased nepotism and corruption. Once formal procedures are regularly ignored, this represents the beginning of the end.

As mentioned, the religious framework of Islam is also dominated by such formalities. The rule of Islam is hierarchically organized, much like an effective bureaucracy. In Islam, the Qur'an and *Sunnah* are primary sources of legislation, followed by the *hadeeth*, followed by conventional wisdom. A well-organized modern bureaucracy in practice should also have a well-defined vertical hierarchy of organization, in which each position has a specific, well-defined task for which that position is responsible (Moe, 1984). Such organization makes accountability easier, and allows one to more easily fix the broken cog in the wheel; this allows for greater fairness and helps minimize excess and waste (Moe, 1984). Well-defined bureaucracies can also allow for a standard of evaluation that the people can use when evaluating the efficiency of a particular bureaucracy's leadership structure. Are the leaders adhering to the codified legal codes, or are they arbitrarily exercising power? Questions like these can be addressed with a codified set of procedures and laws.

Islam as a religion is not the obstacle to modernization; rather the obstacles can be found in the deeply embedded cultural values of individual states. As mentioned,

the prevalence of nepotism and cronyism has been a major hindrance to the development of modern bureaucratic institutions in OIC states (Jreisat 1999; Common 2008). The *Sunnah* of the Prophet Mohammed is explicit in articulating that no individual is above the law. The laws must apply equally to all citizens within Islamic society. Indeed then, it appears that bureaucracy is not only compatible to Islamic political institutions, rather it is fundamental. According to Hai and Nawi (2007), the concept of *al-Shura* (the council) is one of the core principles of organizing an Islamic state. This concept of a consultative council that assists in the process of decision-making dates all the way back to the very beginnings of Islam. The key elements of *al-Shura* that most scholars today agree upon are the following:

- Meeting or consultation that follows the teachings of Islam.
- Consultation following the guidelines of the Qur'an and *Sunnah*.
- There is a leader elected among them to head the meeting.
- The discussion should be based on *mushawarah* (consensus) and *mudhakarah* (remembrance of the Sunnah and Hadith).
- All the members are given fair opportunity to voice out their opinions.
- The issue should be of *maslahah ammah* (public interest).
- The voices of the majority are accepted, provided that it does not violate with the teachings of the Qur'an or *Sunnah*. (Hai, & Nawi, 2007)

These basic ground rules for *al-Shura* can easily all be applied to the way bureaucracies operate in an Islamic state. The rules, if properly observed, could easily transform the way decision-making and public administration are handled throughout the OIC states.

In the *hadeeth* of both Bukhari and Sahih Muslim in regard to the judge:

Amr bin al-As heard Allah's messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) as saying, when a judge gives his decision, having tried his best to decide correctly and is right, there are two rewards for him; and if he gave judgment after having tried his best (to arrive at a correct decision) but erred, there is only one reward for him.

(Ramadan, 2006, p. 20)

The issue of justice is obviously quite important in Islam. This problem of arbitrary enforcement of laws is at the core of the corruption that plagues the Islamic world.

Many states in the Islamic world do not have well-defined bureaucracies that treat individuals equally. The adjudication of disputes must be handled in a fair and even-handed manner. This is also something that is inherent within the original framework outlined by the Prophet Mohammed. Well-defined bureaucratic procedures can mitigate civilian anger at perceived unfairness.

Bureaucracy: Afghanistan and South Asia

The situations surrounding political participation and bureaucratic development differ between OIC member states. Central and South Asia compared to the Middle East have many differences in the way their bureaucracies are theoretically conceived and functionally operate. It is generally accepted that South Asia is more democratic than the Middle East, especially the Gulf States. According to Muqtedar Khan (2006), "Secular Muslim's hold power in most of the Muslim world except Iran, South Asia is more democratic than the Middle East" (p. 153). Khan argues that the role females play in the political systems of Bangladesh and Pakistan are evidence of greater political access for the population of these nations as opposed to Gulf States.

In 1973, Prime Minister Bhutto revamped the Pakistani system of public administration banning castes. Bhutto also made efforts to limit wanton corruption that marked administration in Pakistan during the colonial era. While females have greater influence in the realm of public administration in Pakistan than in the Gulf States, they still are underrepresented and not treated equally by western standards. According to Nasir Islam (2005) women rarely reach the highest echelons of the pay scale in public administration, "Compared to some 800 men [in Pakistan] in the BPS scales 20 and above, there are only 19 women holding posts in these grades" (p. 167). It is also noted that cultural norms in Pakistan, like the Gulf States, limit women's social mobility, especially within the realm of public administration. "Gender differentiation of roles assigns women to domestic roles and encourages an early marriage, having a family and take care of children and domestic work" (Islam, 2005, p. 167). Many husbands actively discourage their wives from working outside the house, regardless of household income. Men in Pakistan would rather be poorer and have more control of their spouse than to have greater wealth and less control. While this may be far less common in the west, it is very common throughout the Muslim world (Almaney, 1981; Islam, 2005). This also means that many highly qualified

women are leaving their posts after marriage and are being replaced by less qualified males.

Pakistan, much like the Arab states, is a much more collectivist rather than individualistic society (Islam, 2005; Jreisat, 1999). Family connections and relations dominate most aspects of daily life. Similar patterns of nepotism and cronyism seen in the Gulf States are also present in Pakistan (Islam, 2005). The situation in Pakistan has deteriorated significantly over the past 15 years. Pakistan went from being ranked 53rd in overall corruption by the transparency international rankings down to 92nd by 2003 (Islam, 2005). Things have continued to spiral out of control from 2003 until 2010. As of 2010, Pakistan was ranked 143rd out of 178 (*Transparency International Corruption Index Rankings*, 2010).

The situation in Afghanistan surrounding bureaucracy is perhaps the direst in the entire Muslim world. As corrupt as Pakistan is, Afghanistan ranked an egregious 176th out of 178 in the corruption standings in 2010; tied with Myanmar and only ahead of Somalia (*Transparency International Corruption Index Rankings*, 2010). Afghanistan is by most metrics a nation state only by definition. Benedict Anderson (1983) in his classic work exploring the phenomenon of nationalism, *Imagined Communities*, argues that an accompanying element of the modern nation state and modern forms of public administration was an ebbing of religiosity. "Yet for all the grandeur and power of the great religiously imagined communities, their *unselfconsciousness coherence* waned steadily after the middle ages" (Anderson, 1983, p. 16). Anderson contests that in Western Europe, the eighteenth century marks not only the dawn of the age of nationalism, but the dusk of religious modes of thought. This led Europe to modernize and develop bureaucratic institutions. Religious modes of thought simply have not eroded away in Afghanistan. If anything, religiosity has become even stronger in recent years following the Soviet and American invasions. I would not argue that Islam is why bureaucracy is underdeveloped in Afghanistan, but its particular interpretation and implementation in places like Afghanistan, along with other cultural and even geographical considerations, has most certainly had some impact on why, from an administrative perspective, things are the way they are.

The rapid increase in literacy and the development of administrative vernaculars during the sixteenth century in Europe has yet to happen in Afghanistan. Prior to the sixteenth century in Europe, the church leaders who spoke Latin controlled daily political affairs. Few people could speak it, and even fewer could read it. The develop-

ment of administrative vernaculars created one national administrative language that everyone could speak and understand, hence giving more power to the people and weakening the strength of the church. "The birth of administrative vernaculars predated both print and the religious upheaval of the sixteenth century, and must therefore be regarded as an independent factor in the erosion of the sacred imagined community" (Anderson, 1983, p. 41). The spread of literacy in Europe allowed for the development of more centrally administered states with extensive bureaucratic apparatuses. Afghanistan in many ways is similar to pre-sixteenth century Europe in this regard.

Afghanistan never experienced this mass advancement in literacy or an administrative vernacular which translated into western styled administration and bureaucracy. At the very least, in the other Islamic countries there is one clearly dominant language and this same dominant language is also the language of administration. Despite the official language used by the Afghan government being Dari, a dialect of Persian, not everyone in Afghanistan can read it or speak it. Numerous local languages are spoken throughout Afghanistan including Persian dialects, Pashto, Uzbek, Turkmen and approximately 30 other minority languages. Afghanistan has a 34% literacy rate according to a 2008 Ministry of Education report. The male literacy rate was 50% while the female literacy rate was a staggering 18% (Afghan Ministry of Education Report, 2008). With such low literacy rates, it is no surprise that Afghanistan never developed modern administrative bureaucratic procedures. There were never enough literate people in any one language to manage complicated paperwork and keep effective records.

Bureaucracy: the Middle East and Gulf States

While Afghanistan is perhaps the least developed particular *state* in terms of bureaucratic development in the Islamic world, the most backwards Islamic *region* in terms of bureaucratic development are the oil-rich Gulf States. In the Gulf States, bureaucracy and public administration during the last century has been ineffective to say the least. They have been the worst at following the Weberian model in the Muslim world. While some of these states operate under charismatic or traditional leadership, they have yet to truly enter into the formalized rational-legal realm (Kamrava, 2005; Peterson, 2005). Written formal procedures have not taken shape in the Gulf States the way they have in the west, nor have roles been as clearly

defined between officials and those holding positions of power. Very few women have roles of any significance within the sphere of public administration in Gulf States (Khan, 2006).

The recent Middle Eastern uprisings have occurred not because of bureaucratic quagmires, such as long lines at the Bureau of Motor Vehicles or people angered at filling out extensive paperwork to receive tax benefits. Rather, these uprisings and government overthrows have occurred due to the arbitrary enforcement of the rules, especially on those who are in power or are closely connected to it. According to Jabbra and Jabbra (2005), "Furthermore, there are no appropriate safeguards and proper checks and balances to protect the Arab public from bureaucratic abuses" (p. 135). While bureaucracies in western popular culture are loathed, the reality is that society cannot function adequately without them (Olsen, 2005). Human beings have limited attention spans and, by nature, like to follow routines and patterns (Rockman, 2000). These routines and patterns are essential for stability in any regime. When the routines and patterns of public officials are not transparent or just, people start to take notice, and the legitimacy of the government comes into question, especially in this age of *Twitter* and *Facebook*. There is little doubt this has been the case in Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain, Yemen, Libya, and now possibly Jordan and Syria.

Some scholars go as far as to argue that Arabic is not conducive to formalized written regulations and procedures. According to A.J. Almaney (1980), "The intrinsic characteristics of Arabic (musicality, resonance, and elegance), coupled with the Arabs' infatuation with sounds and form rather than content, serve as impediments to clear communication" (p. 12). Despite the impediments to communication that Arabic may present due to its intrinsic form, this does not mean Arabic cannot be an effective language of commerce and governance. While Arabic may have unique morphological and phonetic components, this does not mean Arabic-speaking states cannot make a better effort to incorporate modern methods of filing and record keeping. Without turning this into a discussion on linguistics, one can simply look at Italian as an example of a language that possesses a rich variety of morphological and phonetic elements. Nonetheless, it was the language of opera and commerce in the Mediterranean during the renaissance.

Most contemporary scholars recognize that Arab states have not been quick enough in acquiring the modern technological components of bureaucratic administration. "As a consequence, there is a lack of recorded

information about policy decisions. Any information tends to be unreliable and restricted as most decisions are based on the personal preferences of the most senior leaders" (Common, 1989, p. 179). The lack of recorded information and transparency can be traced back to the roots of the problem; nepotism and cronyism. Jamil Jreisat (1999) in regard to the general cronyism and nepotism that dominates in Arab States argues:

Political regimes are deliberate in limiting the scope and directions of change. Political leaders often endorse personnel training or simplification of procedures; they also sprinkle their public statements with calls for more efficient and effective management. At the same time, these political leaders continue to promote to senior government positions unqualified relatives, cronies, and loyalists and to protect various corrupt practices in conducting the public's business. (p. 22)

Nepotism and cronyism are cancers to effective public administration. The corruption and incompetence in many ways spurs from the highly centralized, authoritarian states themselves. Authoritarian states are less transparent and critical of procedural protocol. Jreisat (1999) goes on to argue that there are some specific reasons for this backwardness of Arab bureaucracies. He cites imperialism, which kept the Arab states fragmented, as one major factor. The British during their control of the Middle East regularly did numerous things to weaken any efforts at legitimate local bureaucratic legislation, via payoffs and other underhanded deals. A second issue that plagues Gulf States in particular is centralized control of things like public utilities, banks, railways, gas, electricity, and other major aspects of public life. Without any oversight or legitimate competition, there is minimal public demand for bureaucratic transparency. A third factor Jreisat looks at is the demographic shift in Arab populations. He cites World Bank data and contests that the disproportionate number of people under thirty years of age has placed new burdens on bureaucratic performance (Jreisat, 1992, 1999, 2009). According to Nazih Ayubi (1989), Arab bureaucracies suffer from problems related to overstaffing and low productivity, partially due to the phenomenal population growth experienced by Arab societies in the last 50 years.

As mentioned, each particular Islamic state has its own unique problems that surround its bureaucratic development. Some states have been more effective than others in managing their bureaucracy. According to Common (1989), in Bahrain and Oman, the main problem is

that there is little political pluralism. He notes that political parties are banned, and this historically has resulted in greater stability in these particular regimes in comparison to other Gulf States. While the oil revenues in these particular states have been very large, the modernization of Bahrain and Oman has not yet occurred. Administrative change in Oman has been more incremental than in Bahrain. The structure of the constitutionality of the state explains this difference. According to Common, Oman has a set of basic laws which at some level underpins its decision-making process. Bahrain does not have such a set of laws. Common concludes that traditional Islamic and Bedouin values dominate the political and social landscapes of Bahrain and Oman. "In particular there is a high degree of collectivism within 'in-groups' (tribe or extended family), and high individualism with 'out-groups' (non-kin and foreign workers)" (Common, 1989, p.183). These particular traditional values make modernizing bureaucracy quite difficult. Families in these particular countries often take care of each other, and do not even really expect any type of assistance from their governments. This obviously works well for the wealthiest and most powerful families, but those who are poor or are of foreign descent are at a major disadvantage.

In a 2009 article, Jreisat contests that all of the Arab states still need to modernize. There are new models of information systems available. Even though incorporating new information technologies can be expensive, they need to be done. Jreisat (2009) states:

Coordination and institutionalizing information systems, however, compel organizations to also confront challenges. One is the choice of technology that is most relevant and economical to the organization. Second is the quality and relevance of data gathered and transmitted by technology. Third is the interconnectivity, cross-organizations and cross-cultures that expands the horizons of management beyond the traditional boundaries. (p.39)

It is via modernization that bureaucracies are better equipped to address and confront issues related to performance. In Lebanon and Egypt, the general lack of modern technological systems, coupled with buildings that are not structurally equipped to handle such systems have been quite problematic (Jabbara & Jabbara, 2005). Jreisat (2009) is particularly disappointed with Saudi Arabia which failed to assume the leadership role that it should in modernizing the region. He contests that in spite of Saudi Arabia's almost endless oil supply and ability to generate wealth, the smaller, less influential Gulf States

actually have made greater efforts at modernization (Jreisat 2009). Bureaucratic expansion has not resulted in greater accountability in the KSA. "The new and rapid expansion of the bureaucracy did not provide an environment conducive to the internalization and development of accountability among the new Saudi public servants" (Jabbara & Jabbara, 2005, p.141). Confusion and poorly defined roles continue to plague Saudi Arabia.

Jabbara and Jabbara (2005) go on to argue that there are six specific cultural streams that largely account for the reason Gulf States are the way they are. They argue that over-centralization, outmoded systems, administrative expansion, overstaffing, rigidity, and complex rules and salary structures are all problems endemic to Arab states (Jabbara & Jabbara, 2005). As the world becomes more technologically advanced, Arab and non-Arab Islamic states are going to have to be even more focused on developing their bureaucratic administrations if they are to remain even remotely competitive with other rising international powers in East Asia and Latin America that have made stronger efforts at modernizing their bureaucracy. Civil servants continue to need vastly improved training and education (Nakib, 1972). The days of an absolute monarch making a verbal decree and expecting that to be final are all but over.

Conclusion: Literature Gaps and the Future

The question of assimilating religious minorities is perhaps the area in which the literature on bureaucratic development in Islamic states is the weakest. While some states are almost entirely Muslim, other states, such as Egypt, have sizeable minority Christian populations. The question of accommodating for these minorities is an essential question that future literature should seek to address. Within the framework of Islamic law, Christians and other non-Muslim groups are not subject to the principles of Shari'a law. Non-Muslims have historically been permitted to behave as they wish in their own homes. According to Sherman Jackson (2005), "This applied not only to 'soft disagreements,' for example, pork consumption, but to practices deemed by Muslims to be downright morally repugnant" (p.144). Of course, this does not mean that the issue of applying legal and administrative procedures amongst these populations has been solved. During the Middle Ages those Christians and Jews were not obligated to adhere to the Shari'a law, according to Mark Cohen (1995). Jews were allowed to adjudicate their legal matters in *Halakhic* courts (Cohen, 1995). In

recent times though, this line has been blurred. What has been termed by many as the Great Islamic Awakening of the late twentieth century will bring these issues back to prominence. Future legal decisions and scholarly literature in this area of administrative and legal policy will be critically important.

A second area of weakness in the literature and research in the area of public administration in Islamic states is that most of the top research comes from the same scholars. While public administration and bureaucracy in the west has been widely studied by a veritable army of scholars for over a century now, the scholarship on bureaucracy in the Muslim world has been studied in depth only by a handful of scholars. When conducting research, the same four or five names keep reappearing as a source in almost every article. Most of the prominent scholars reside in the United States. Based on available biographical information, most are senior faculty or are retired at this point. There is nothing inherently bad about this, but it does mean that more people, especially younger scholars, need to get involved and offer new approaches and perspectives in this particular area of bureaucracy studies.

The literature seems to show that the future is wide open still in these developing states. At the core of the

recent uprisings in the Middle East is an anger at the perceived incompetence and corruption of governments led by dictators and out of touch monarchs. The leaders of Tunisia and Egypt were uprooted not simply because they were not democratic. They were uprooted because their populations were tired of the ineptitude of their leadership. Vast oil resources mean that money to modernize existing infrastructures exists in the Gulf States and Middle East. Even in Afghanistan, it is now widely believed by geologists that there is billions of dollars worth of mineral resources that are readily and easily available for mining (Risen, 2010). Modernizing government and public institution is more a question of will rather than resources in this particular area of the world. Recent uprisings in states traditionally dominated by authoritarian regimes may signal the end of the good old boys system. Demands for fairness and transparency may very well spur a renaissance in attitudes and research surrounding methods of public administration in this vital part of the world.

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Teenage Pregnancy Rates: A Multiple Regression Analysis of Teen Pregnancy Rates and the Correlates for Texas Counties in the Year 2010

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ABSTRACT: *This report examines a myriad of research on teenage pregnancy across the United States and specifically the state of Texas to elucidate the correlates involved with teenage pregnancy rates. This research includes studies compiled mostly from the 2010 census in Texas counties and employs a multiple regression analysis of the variables to determine the statistical significance of each one in relation to teenage pregnancy rates. The key factors presented in this research offer a valuable resource as law makers and legislatures continuously look to teenage pregnancy research while evaluating how to reduce the rates of unplanned pregnancies and developing new legislation concerning abortion.*

Introduction

Teenage pregnancy has become an epidemic in Texas where there are 54,000 births to teenage mothers a year. In 2010 only two states in the nation had a higher birth rate, according to the Texas Department of State Health Services. Every 10 minutes a teenager in Texas gets pregnant, and as far as repeat teen births, defined as females between the ages of 15 and 19 who have a second child, Texas leads the nation (Sanders, 2011). Having the third highest teen pregnancy rate and the highest repeat birth rate in the nation negatively affects the welfare and economy of Texans, as this research will show there is a correlation between teenage pregnancy and low income levels; therefore, people expect the state government to do something about this costly problem. Barb Steinberg, a social worker from Austin, TX specializing in working with female adolescents notes, "We know that girls (teen moms) are more likely to drop out of school so they are lacking in education . . . We know that they are more likely to experience poverty, and we know that their children are affected negatively as well" (Sanders, 2011, para. 6). As Gretchen Sanders (2011) explains, children of teenage mothers tend not to receive adequate health-care or education, and in combination with these factors, she argues that there is a link between the children of teenage mothers and higher rates of incarceration.

Texas officials are at odds over what the most effective way to decrease the rates of teen pregnancy in the state is. On one hand, Governor Perry and others think that abstinence is the best way to reduce pregnancy rates and that it alone should be taught in schools. On the other hand, many experts say that abstinence-only programs are less effective than comprehensive programs, which give school-age children access to useful and helpful information along with contraceptives. These comprehensive programs not only help the children, but they also educate parents on how to speak to their children about sex and pregnancy prevention.

In this study we have taken 13 variables of interest with the target focus on females aged 13–17 years in all 254 Texas counties in 2010 and tried to find what really affects teen pregnancy. The variables researched include age, race, economic status, education level, employment, religion, rural percentage, income, population size, and divorce rates.

Literature Review

Over the years, teenage pregnancy has become more and more accepted and talked about in the United States. Previous literature shows that teenage pregnancy rates across the United States have been steadily decreasing since the 1950's. These studies have sought to identify

and understand what key factors have a correlation with teenage pregnancy rates.

Economic Status or Income Level

Finkelstein, Finkelstein, Christie, Roden, and Shelton (1982) studied 14–16 year-old mothers, 70% of whom were unmarried, and most of the fathers were 4 to 5 years older than the mothers. Most of the mothers were living with their parents and had incomes in the poverty range. The study showed that race was a factor, as 14–15 year old African American female adolescents had proportionally more pregnancies than White adolescent females and their first prenatal visits were much later on average. Children of White mothers later had more acute illness visits during the 2-year follow up. Looking at the children of the teenage mothers compared to a group of 20–30 year old mothers, the mental development of the children of the teenagers was not at the same level as the comparison group (Finkelstein et al., 1982). Low economic status is a strong indicator of early sexual activity, pregnancy, and child bearing. It is significantly related to pregnancies in early and middle adolescents, and strongly correlated with living arrangements (Shirley & Long, 2004). Ethnic and racial disparity is interrelated with socioeconomic status; African American and Hispanic teens frequently live in low income families as compared to White teens (Shirley & Long, 2004).

Race

In general, high teenage pregnancy rates in the United States are often associated with the country's large minority population. While pregnancy rates among racial and ethnic groups do vary greatly, studies in the early 1980s showed that even the rates for White teens in the United States were among the highest in the world compared with other industrialized nations (Shirley & Long, 2004). In Texas Shirley and Long (2004) found that Hispanic and African American teens experienced birth rates much higher than White teens. However, White adolescent females who became pregnant had abortions more often than pregnant teenagers from minority groups. The study included both teens and older women; researchers found that, on average, African American women have their first child approximately four-fifths of a year before White women. African American women are more likely at each age level to become pregnant earlier than White or Hispanic women (Shirley & Long, 2004).

Age

Another variable used in relation with this dependent variable of teenage pregnancy is age. The classification of a teenager ranges from the age of 13 to 19; however, many classify a teenager as someone between the ages of 13 to 17. Finkelstein et al. (1982) found that there was some relation between age and teenage pregnancy. In this particular study there were two different groups of women compared: groups of female adolescents ages 14, 15, and 16 and a group of 100 women ages 20–30 years (Finkelstein et al., 1982). Some of the outcomes of this study were that the "1-min Apgar scores for the children of 14 year olds were lower and the school dropout rate was higher with increasing maternal age. In comparing the teen to the 20–30-year-old group, the only finding was higher complication rate for pregnancy and delivery for the teen group" (Finkelstein et al., 1982, p. 1). In other words, there is not a significant difference in the children when the age of the mother is in the teenage range; however, the difficulties for the mother socially, mentally, emotionally, and physically are much more significant to a teenager than that of a woman in her 20s or 30s, according to this data.

Education

The amount of education that a teenage mother has received is one factor that really influences teenage pregnancy. It would be very easy to assume that teens who do not go to school are at greater risk, but this is not the case (Shirley & Long, 2004). Enrollment in school alone does not exactly lower the rate of teenage pregnancy. The real determining factor is the students' educational aspirations. Consequently, when the educational goals of teens increase, the rate of teenage pregnancy begins to decline. Another study showed counties with higher education levels had lower teenage pregnancy rates. Each additional year of schooling delayed a teenage girl's first birth by almost three fourths of a year (Shirley & Long, 2004). It is still not very clear whether pregnancy causes girls to drop out, or if the reason they are pregnant is because they dropped out of school.

Employment

Employment and education are two highly related variables. Teenagers who do not have jobs have more free time, and more time alone while their parents may be at work. If a teenage mother drops out of high school, it would be more difficult for her to obtain a job because employers may not be willing to hire someone without a high school diploma or GED. A woman who goes to

school, obtains a job, and keeps that job for more than one year has the possibility of higher wages and lowers the risk of premarital pregnancy (Shirley & Long, 2004). Teenage mothers find it difficult to maintain a job because they may not have much help with the child, and often, by the time they have or would have graduated high school, they have more than one child.

Rural/Urban

A study investigating the association between socio-demographic factors and adolescent females aged 14–16 years having children found that the location of these teenagers' residences—whether rural, urban or border communities—might be significant (Castrucci, Clark, Lewis, Samsel, & Mirchandani, 2010). This study observed the differences of rural, urban, and border areas from 2000–2004. In this period, the study found that among the 29,186 births to female adolescents aged 14–16 years “having both parents born outside of the U.S. was associated with a 5.29 (95% CI: 4.82, 5.80) times increase in the odds of the paternal age of 20 years or older; in comparison to having both parents born in the U.S. Parental place of birth was associated with greater odds of parental age of 20 years or older in urban areas compared to rural or border areas” (Castrucci et al., 2010, p. 899). In other words, this set of data shows that if both parents are born outside the United States they have a greater risk of having a child while they are under the age of 20; however, if both parents are born in the United States it is more likely that the parents will be under the age of 20 in a rural or border area than in an urban area.

Population Density

In densely populated areas there may be more teen pregnancies. However, in areas in which the population density is low, there may be a higher teenage pregnancy rate. In areas that have a higher female-to-male ratio there will be more pregnancies (Shirley & Long, 2004). The effect of population density really comes down to the type of area that is being examined. For instance, in Texas, Dallas will have more teenage pregnancies than Hartley, because there are more teenagers in Dallas. Therefore, a teenager's chance of getting pregnant must be assessed by evaluating the specific pregnancy rate for a county rather than the overall number of pregnancies in a county.

Divorce

Many teens who get pregnant often feel that the next best step is to get married. However, men and women who marry as teens are more likely to get divorced than

couples who are over 25 years at the time of marriage (Shirley & Long, 2004). It is difficult for marriages between teenagers to last; when a teenage pregnancy is thrown into the mix, it makes things even more difficult. This is just one aspect of divorce and its correlation with teenage pregnancy. Another possible factor in an increased risk of teenage pregnancy is girls who were raised in a divorced family, with the father being absent. A study of girls in fatherless homes was compared to that of teenage boys and the link between an absent father and the boys' involvement in criminal behavior at an early age. The results showed that female adolescents reared in fatherless homes are twice as likely to end up pregnant, and the boys are more likely to be involved in criminal activity (University of California at Santa Barbara, 1996). Economists at the University of California at Santa Barbara discovered that it is hard for teenage girls to cope with the absence of their father; therefore, they are likely to engage in potentially self-destructive behavior trying to compensate for his absence (University of California at Santa Barbara, 1996). It becomes a perpetual cycle because those raised in a divorced home are at greater risk of becoming pregnant as a teenager, and pregnant teenagers that get married are more likely to become divorced.

Religion

Many studies have examined how religion correlates with teenage pregnancy rates. Joseph Strayhorn of Drexel University College of Medicine studied nearly 36,000 subjects regarding the relation between religion and teenage pregnancy rates (Bryner, 2009). Strayhorn “found a strong correlation between statewide conservative religiousness and statewide teen birth rates, even when they accounted for income and abortion rates” (Bryner, 2009, para. 11). The results of this study show many different possible relations between religion and teenage pregnancy. For example, states in the United States “whose residents have more conservative religious beliefs on average tend to have higher rates of teenagers giving birth” (Bryner, 2009, para. 1). This is shown to be possibly due “to the fact that communities with such religious beliefs (a literal interpretation of the Bible, for instance) may frown upon contraception . . . If that same culture isn't successfully discouraging teen sex, the pregnancy and birth rates rise” (Bryner, 2009, para. 2). In this particular study “Mississippi topped the list for conservative religious beliefs and teen birth rates” (Bryner, 2009, para. 3). As Strayhorn notes, “We conjecture that religious communities in the U.S. are more successful in discouraging the use of contraception among their teen-

agers than they are in discouraging sexual intercourse itself” (Bryner, 2009, para. 4).

This particular study seeks to try to present a clearer picture of these variables and how they correlate with the dependent variable, teenage pregnancy ages ranging from 13–17, from the year 2010 in all 254 Texas counties.

Methodology

Data Sources

The data for teenage pregnancy rates in the United States was prepared by the National Campaign to Prevent Teen Pregnancy and Unplanned Pregnancy, January 2010 (Kost, Henshaw, & Carlin, 2010). The U.S. rates describe pregnancies per 1,000 adolescents aged 15–19 years, in 2005. The female population age 13–17 years and teenage pregnancy rates for Texas and Texas counties come from the Texas Department of State Health Services in 2010 in which pregnancy is defined per 1,000 adolescents between 13 and 17 years. The Texas counties’ median household income is compiled by the County Information Program, Texas Association of Counties from the data source of U.S. Census Bureau, and Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates of 2012 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012). The total population and county-level demographic data of Texas and each individual county for the White, Black, Hispanic, and Native American populations were gathered from the Texas State Data Center for the census of 2010 (Texas State Data Center, 2010). The Association of Religious Data Archives presents a myriad of well-researched data on the topic of religious adherents for each county in the state of Texas.

Operational Definitions of Variables of Interest

- Ethnicity and race data for the year 2010 come directly from the State Data Center. The study explores the percentage of the population that is White, Black, Hispanic, and Native American.
- The median household income and per capita income for 2011 produces the socioeconomic status average in each county. Overall poverty rates and child poverty rates in 2000 were looked at as well. Each variable’s data are collected from the Texas State Data Center.
- Political Geography is addressed by the percentage of the county population that lives in a rural area. Therefore, data for percent urban is the difference between the total population percentage and the rural area percentage drawn from the Texas State Data Center.
- Education data come from the Texas State Data Center. Education attainment is described as residents 25 years

of age or older with a high school diploma. This study does not assess those who have attained an alternative high school education such as a GED or attended secondary achievement school. The data set in this study shows only the percentage of people with a high school diploma above the age of 24.

- County unemployment data come from the Texas State Data Center. The data in this study show only the percentage rate of the population that is unemployed in 2010.
- Religious data come from the Association of Religion Data Archives. The religious affiliation rates are separated into three categories of classification. This study shows the rate of the population that is either Evangelical adherents, Mainline adherents, or Catholic adherents.

Research Findings

- Historic trends analyze the teenage pregnancy rates for the United States from 1950 to 2002 (Allan Guttmacher Institute, 2004).
- Studies from the Texas Department of Health compare the average Texas pregnancy rates with the highest-ranking county in Texas pregnancy rate for the years of 1994–2003.
- Kost et al. (2010) show the ranking of Texas compared to the teenage pregnancy rates in the other 49 states as well as the steady decline of pregnancy rates between each state.
- The study by Kost et al. (2010) provides evidence of the gradual decrease in pregnancy rates in Texas overall and within each of the ethnic classifications of White, Black, and Hispanic.
- Additional data from the Texas State Data Center (2010) compare the demographic data of the highest ranked Texas County in relation to the average of all counties in Texas. Some counties may have a higher rate or percentage with a specific category and then have a significantly lower rate or percentage in another because of the varying demographics of each county. For example, Brooks County has the highest teen pregnancy rate in Texas, but Harris County ranks first in terms of numbers of pregnancies in Texas. This is because Brooks County has 16 total teenage pregnancies out of a teenage female population of 245. On the other hand, Harris County has a pregnancy rate of 22.2 because there were a total of 3,306 teenage pregnancies out of a teenage female population of 148,696.

Analysis

Most of the literature on teenage pregnancy points out that pregnancy rates for teenagers is steadily decreasing. Data from the Allan Guttmacher Institute demonstrates that from 1950 to 2001, the teenage pregnancy rates dropped from 40.7 to 24.7 teen pregnancies per 1,000 teens between the ages of 15 and 17 years (Allan Guttmacher Institute, 2004).

Highest Counties and U.S. Compared to Texas

Teenage pregnancy rates in Texas and in the counties with higher teenage pregnancy rates consistently follow the trends observed nationwide. Between 1994 and 2003 the teenage pregnancy rates declined by nearly a third from a percentage of 41.5 to 27.6 (Texas Department of Health, 2010). However, Texas ranks 47 out of 50 in the U.S. (Kost et al., 2010). According to the National Campaign to Prevent Teen Pregnancy and Unplanned Pregnancy, the average teenage pregnancy rates in Texas are still substantially higher than the averages in the United States. The data examined by Kost et al. (2010) shows the overall change in pregnancy rates per 1,000 adolescents aged 15 to 19 among each state from 1988 to 2005. Through these years the teen pregnancy rates in Texas have decreased by 24.8% and the United States average decreased by 36.9% (Kost et al., 2010). Additionally, their data shows the relative teenage pregnancy rates of White, Black, and Hispanic populations in the 254 counties of Texas. All rates show a steady decline from 1990 to 2002. Of note, the highest rate among these three ethnic groups belongs to those who identify as Hispanic (Kost et al., 2010).

Demographic and Social Profile of Texas Counties in 2010

Teenage pregnancy rates in Texas have shown a slow and steady decline, but they are still higher than average rates found in the United States. The preceding part of the paper delved into the possible explanations for why Texas has one of the highest pregnancy rates in the United States. The following are demographic variables we found to have a correlation with teenage pregnancy rates in Texas counties.

Pregnancies, Live Births, Fetal Deaths, and Abortions to Women 13 to 17 Years of Age

According to the Texas Department of Health, Brooks County had the highest teenage pregnancy rate in 2010 of 65.3%. Of the 7,223 residents in Brooks County, 6,590 were Hispanic. Harris County had the highest number of pregnancies, and of the population of 4 million, the largest ethnic group was Hispanics with 1.6 million. Since Harris County had the largest population in 2010, it is understandable that they experienced the most live births, fetal deaths, and abortions.

Race and Ethnicity

The population of Texas is closely dichotomous in terms of ethnic groups. In 2010, 46% of the population was White and 38% was Hispanic. The counties with the high concentration of a particular ethnic group were Starr and Maverick (Texas State Data Center, 2010). Both counties had a 96% Hispanic population and Brooks County trailed closely with a total Hispanic population of 91%. On the other hand, Harris County's ethnic and racial population closely mimicked the percentages of Texas' average with 34% White, 19% African American, and 41% Hispanic. While Texas residents are 46% White, Clay County's population is slightly more than 94% White. African Americans make up nearly 12% of the Texas population, but the highest county percentage of African Americans is 34% in Jefferson County. Thirty-eight percent of the Texas population was Hispanic in 2010; however, current research by the U.S. Census Bureau shows that Hispanics will outnumber the White population by the year 2020 in Texas (Window on State Government, 2000).

Socioeconomic Status

The literature indicates that poverty levels are linked with teen pregnancy rates. The median household income for Texas was over \$48,000 in 2010 (Texas State Data Center, 2010). The county with the largest median household income was Rockwall County with over \$84,000 and the lowest was Zavala County with \$22,982. However, Starr County was not far behind with a median income just over \$24,000. Significantly, at 6.1% Rockwall County has one of the lowest teenage pregnancy rates in Texas for 2010. In contrast, Zavala County has over double the Texas average of 21% with a teen pregnancy rate of 48%. These statistics support the previous research that income level correlates to teenage pregnancy rates.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation
Teenage Pregnancy Percent	22.4543	11.67959
County Percent White	81.1465	8.57900
County Percent Black	6.3264	6.67175
County Percent Hispanic or Latino/a	32.2657	22.92965
County Percent Native American	.7291	.39665
County Median Household Income	42562.91	9668.691
Percentage of Residents over 25 with High School Diploma	77.3319	8.29889
County Unemployment Rate	7.3846	2.21749
Percent of County Population Rural	55.5202	31.90337
Divorce Percent	8.7449	1.85725
Rate of Evangelical Adherents	372.5785	182.47645
Rate of Mainline Adherents	102.3140	60.39953
Rate of Catholic Adherents	177.1159	168.75159

N=254

Religious Adherents

The majority of the Texas counties’ residents are Evangelical Christian (Grammich et al., 2012). Jim Hogg County, which has the second highest Catholic adherents rate in Texas of 910.62, also has a teenage pregnancy rate of 50% (Grammich et al., 2012).

Political Geography

Texas seems to be no exception to the observation that teenage pregnancy is more common in urban populations (Texas State Data Center, 2010). Texas has a myriad of counties that are predominately rural, and most of these rural counties are equal to or lower than the state average pregnancy rate.

Divorced Percentage

Jones County has a divorced percentage of 15, almost double that of the state of Texas (Texas State Data Center, 2010). Although Jones County has the highest divorce rate, the teenage pregnancy rate is significantly lower than the average teenage pregnancy rate in Texas. Further shown by the analysis concerning correlations, teenage pregnancy rates seem to have no significant correlation with divorce percentages in Texas. The literature suggests that a high divorce rate should be positively correlated with teenage pregnancy.

Education

Almost all sources contend that teenage pregnancy is related to education such that as education levels decline, teenage pregnancy rates increase. Data from the Texas State Data Center (2010) show that Collin County has the highest percentage of persons over 25 with at least a high school diploma (92.8%). Collin County has a teenage pregnancy rate of 7% which is substantially lower than the Texas average of 21.4%. There are 145 counties that have higher education rates (age 25+ w/ H.S. Diploma) than the average in Texas. Of those 145 counties, 114 (78.6%) have a lower teen pregnancy rate than the county average in Texas (Texas State Data Center, 2010).

Unemployment

Previous literature suggests that the rate of teenage pregnancy is affected by unemployment rates. In 2010 Starr County had the highest percentage of unemployment in the state of Texas, more than doubling the Texas unemployment average (Texas State Data Center, 2010). Starr County is ranked 25th in Texas for county teenage pregnancy rates, with 1 being the highest and 254 being the lowest. Starr County led with both the highest Hispanic population and unemployment rates (Texas State Data Center, 2010). This observation suggests a possible correlation between these two variables. Further research would need to be done to determine if there was a positive correlation signifying that as Hispanic rates increase, unemployment rates increase also.

Table 2. Coefficients^a

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
	B	Std. Error	β	t	Sig.
1 (Constant)	28.441	22.178		1.282	.201
County Percent White	-.060	.168	-.044	-.356	.722
County Percent Black	.111	.252	.063	.439	.661
County Percent Hispanic or Latino/a	.231	.066	.454	3.497	.001
County Percent Native American	-.243	1.681	-.008	-.144	.885
County Median Household Income	.000	.000	-.307	-4.376	.000
Percentage of Residents over 25 with High School Diploma	-.042	.125	-.030	-.399	.735
County Unemployment Rate	.065	.344	.012	.188	.851
Percent of County Population Rural	-.054	.024	-.148	-2.302	.022
Divorce Percent	.686	.377	.109	1.817	.070
Rate of Evangelical Adherents	.009	.005	.139	1.899	.060
Rate of Mainline Adherents	.022	.011	.116	1.969	.050
Rate of Catholic Adherents	.005	.005	.074	.984	.326

^aDependent Variable: Teenage Pregnancy Percent

Data Configured in SPSS

Table 1, labeled Descriptive Statistics, contains the mean and standard deviation of the thirteen variables computed for all 254 counties in Texas. The mean portrays the data percentage or rate specific to the particular variable listed when all 254 counties are averaged together. The standard deviation shows the amount of variation or difference from the mean. A standard deviation with a higher value indicates the data have a larger range and are more spread out. A low standard deviation signifies that the data tends not to vary very far from the mean.

The Model Summary table gives the R^2 value. The R^2 in this research is equal to 0.418. The number for R^2 represents the amount of variance that is explained by the variables used in the research. Therefore, these thirteen variables explain 41.8% of the variance, meaning that just under 60% of this statistical model on teenage pregnancy rates is unexplained.

The coefficients table (Table 2) displays the statistics for linear regression that was run on these data of teenage pregnancy rates in Texas counties. The importance of this table is specifically in the last column titled Sig. This column displays whether or not each variable is statistically significant. In relation to this research, a sig value, also written as the p value, has significance if it is 0.05 or

lower. If the p value is closer to zero, it has a higher level of significance.

Table 3, titled Correlations, demonstrates which variables have a correlation or relation to the dependent variable of teenage pregnancy percentage and the strength of that relation. If the Pearson Correlation number is closer to 1, whether positive or negative, it is significant. If the correlation number is negative that means there is a negative relation. For example, as one variable increases the other variable decreases. A positive correlation number shows a positive relation. As one variable increases the other variable increases, but it is important to remember that correlation does not necessarily equate to causation.

Conclusion

This paper achieves a myriad of equivalent conclusions drawn by previous research on teenage pregnancy rates. There are several strong correlates for teenage pregnancy that are statistically identified from this study, which include ethnicity, median household income, and political geography. This research identifies a positive correlation between the percentage of Hispanic population and teenage pregnancy rates. As the Hispanic population increased, the teenage pregnancy rate also increased. The second and most significant variable in this study

Table 3. Model Summary

Model	R	R ²	Adj-R ²	Std Error of the Estimate
1	.646 ^a	.418	.389	9.13036

^aPredictors: (Constant), Teenage Pregnancy Percent, County Percent White, County Percent African American, County Percent Hispanic or Latino/a, County Percent Native American, County Median Household Income, Percentage of Residents over 25 with High School Diploma, County Unemployment Rate, Percent of County Population Rural, Divorce Percent, Rate of Evangelical Adherents, Rate of Mainline Adherents, Rate of Catholic Adherents

is income. It is highly significant, but the correlation is negative with teenage pregnancy rates. Therefore, as the percentage of median household income increases in a county, the teenage pregnancy rate decreases. This finding is tantamount to previous research identifying poverty levels as one of the greatest correlates to teenage pregnancy. The third significant independent variable is the percentage of the county that is rural. This correlation was also negative, which means that as the percentage of the population that is rural increases the teenage pregnancy rate declines. This specific result is of interest because the surface area of Texas is close to 270,000 square miles. Comparatively, Texas has more land mass than France and is two times the size of Germany. With such a large area, it is no surprise that 57 (23%) counties in Texas have a rural percentage of 100% (Texas State Data Center, 2010). Of those 57 counties, 19 have a teenage pregnancy rate higher than the 21.4% average pregnancy rate of Texas. Although a significant amount of Texas is made up of rural population, the handful of urban, metropolitan areas in Texas have some of the highest population numbers in the United States. This could possibly explain why Texas has been ranked as one of the top five states with the highest teen pregnancy rates.

There were two variables, education and divorce, that previous literature showed to have a significant relationship with teenage pregnancy. However, this study shows that there was not a statistical significance between teenage pregnancy rates and the education level or divorce rate in each county in Texas. A possible explanation, pertaining to divorce correlation with teenage pregnancy, as to why this research conducted in Texas counties did

not support previous literature could be attributed to the fact that the compared literature included other variables not included in this study. For example, in the study conducted at the University of California, Santa Barbara, Phillips and Comanor concluded that the absence of the father significantly affects the son more than the daughter. Their research was based on the effect towards the son and daughter individually in a single parent house (University of California of Santa Barbara, 1996). However, this study in Texas counties only accounts for variables affecting the pregnant teens, which of course are females and not their male counterparts. Further research will need to be conducted to determine what other factors may explain how education and divorce play a role with pregnancy rates and if Texas' results are atypical when compared to other states. This research shows that there is a statistical significance between the percentage of Hispanic population, education, income, and percentage of a county being rural. Future research needs to examine other confounding variables that may affect the negative correlation between the three aforementioned variables and the percentage of Hispanic population, which seems to consistently have the highest percentage of teenage pregnancy.

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Whiners Never Win: Lessons Learned from Candidates' Reactions to Negative Attacks in the 2004 Presidential Campaign

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ABSTRACT: *This article looks at the 2004 presidential campaigns of George W. Bush and John Kerry to understand better how candidates and their campaigns should attack each other and react to being attacked. These campaigns are examined because Bush and Kerry faced aggressive attacks over their backgrounds, and each reacted differently to these charges, contributing to Bush's reelection. Although occurring on a smaller stage, attacks and charges take place in races throughout the United States every election season. At whatever level these elections occur, lessons can be learned from the experiences and efforts of Bush and Kerry in 2004.*

Although the phrase "Image is everything" may not be entirely applicable to political campaigns, the public image that different candidates have is nevertheless important and often makes the difference between winning and losing. Consequently, campaigns spend tremendous time, energy, and money trying to establish the image of their candidate, highlighting his or her credentials, accomplishments, traits, values, policy beliefs, and what the candidate would do if elected. In addition, many campaigns also try to shape the image of their opponent by raising questions about the opponent's experience, personal life, beliefs, qualifications, values, or past misdeeds. Indeed, candidates want to influence how the public perceives them and their opponents. Great effort is made in constructing the political landscape by which the public makes that judgment.

In the middle of a heated political campaign, debate often surfaces in the media about the effects of negative campaigning, alleging the public does not want negative campaigns. Among political scientists the question revolves around the effects of negative campaigning on voter turnout and how people feel toward the political system (e.g., Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; Finkel & Geer, 1998; Freedman & Goldstein, 1999; Kahn & Kenney, 1999; Lau, Sigelman, Heldman, & Babbit, 1999; Wattemberg & Brians, 1999; Goldstein & Freedman, 2002). Despite the arguments among pundits and political scientists on what negative campaigning does to the electorate, among campaign professionals the question is whether it helps their candidate win. To this question comes a resounding, "Yes!" As long as this answer remains the same, negative campaigning will continue to be prevalent.

Because negative campaigning is an integral part of campaigns and may affect who wins and who loses, candidates need to know how best to respond to personal attacks; the way a candidate responds is important because a candidate's image is not only affected by what his opponent says about him but also how he responds to such attacks. Should the candidate fire back with his own salvos or take the high ground? If candidates are going to respond, how should they do so? How aggressive should candidates be in their own defense?

Answers to these questions are difficult but essential to candidates and their campaigns. To understand better how to attack and respond to attacks this article examines the 2004 presidential campaign between John Kerry and George W. Bush. This campaign is examined for a number of reasons. First, it was one of the most negative campaigns in recent presidential campaign history. The charges that were hurled back and forth were highly personal, ranging from allegations of President Bush going AWOL from the National Guard to Senator Kerry fabricating his heroic deeds in Vietnam. Another reason is that Bush and Kerry and their campaigns offer a contrast in how they responded to these attacks, which made a difference in the campaign and perhaps even in the election outcome.

After examining the attacks on Bush's National Guard service and Kerry's Vietnam service and how both candidates and their campaigns leveled criticisms and responded to being attacked, the article draws conclusions about the most effective ways to deal with negative campaigning. These lessons can be applied to gubernatorial, congressional, and other election campaigns and provide a better understanding of negative campaigning overall.

Bush and the National Guard Controversy

Rumors and questions about Bush's National Guard service circulated for many years, particularly around election time. To his opponents, Bush had never satisfactorily answered questions about whether he had received preferential treatment in getting into the National Guard, and, once in, whether he had actually fulfilled his National Guard commitment. The Democrats decided to raise these questions early and often in 2004 hoping that it would keep the focus on Kerry's military record and the contrast between his and Bush's service during the Vietnam War. They also wanted to warn the Republicans that they would vigorously fight back if Republicans portrayed Kerry and the Democrats as soft on defense (Seelye, 2004; Bumiller & Halbinger, 2004).

Although initially Kerry and the other Democratic presidential candidates refrained from attacking Bush's Guard service, other Democrats were more than willing to do so (Romano, 2004). Max Cleland, a former United States senator from Georgia who had lost reelection in 2002 and had served in Vietnam where he lost three limbs, appeared with Kerry at a campaign rally in South Carolina shortly before the state's primary, saying, "We need somebody who has felt the sting of battle, not someone who didn't even complete his tour stateside in the Guard" (Healy, 2004a). Terry McAuliffe, chair of the Democratic National Committee, said, "I look forward to that debate when John Kerry, a war hero with a chest full of medals, is standing next to George Bush, a man who was AWOL in the Alabama National Guard. George Bush never served in our military in our country. He didn't show up when he should have showed up" (Page, 2004).

Kerry did not attack Bush's National Guard service directly at this time but wisely left the issue hanging out for public consumption, saying that Bush's military record was "a question that I think remains open. It's not up to me to talk about them or to question them at this point. I don't even know what the facts are. But I think it's up to the president and the military to answer those questions" (Healy, 2004b).

How to react to attacks is a question all campaigns confront at some point, and different advisors and candidates have different opinions and strategy on what to do. This was the case with the Bush campaign. There was initial disagreement within the Bush campaign on whether it should counter these charges. Some in the Bush campaign feared that responding to the attacks would only draw more attention to the charges. Others, however, argued

the accusations, if left unanswered, would be accepted by the public and contribute to defining the campaign.

The Republicans, as was the norm throughout the campaign, decided to fire back quickly. Ed Gillespie, chair of the Republican National Committee, responded to McAuliffe's statement, calling it "despicable" and "an affront to all those who serve honorably in the National Guard" (Page, 2004). "President Bush served honorably in the National Guard. He was never AWOL. To make an accusation like that on national television with no basis in fact is despicable" (Seelye, 2004).

Two days later, in a carefully planned initiative, the Bush campaign, the White House, and the Republican Party forcefully defended Bush's service in the National Guard and attacked Democrats for bringing up the questions in the first place. Scott McClellan, White House press secretary, in a televised briefing, said it was "a shame that this issue was brought up four years ago during the campaign, and it is a shame that it is being brought up again. The president fulfilled his duties. The president was honorably discharged. I think it is sad to see some stoop to this level, especially so early in an election year." McClellan's briefing was followed by a statement issued by Marc Racicot, Bush's campaign chairman, who said that Kerry was "supporting a slanderous attack. By embracing this line of attack, Senator Kerry has made clear that he will accept and promote character assassination, innuendo and falsehood even when he doesn't have all the facts." Gillespie said on CNN that McAuliffe "has become the John Wilkes Booth of presidential character assassination." The RNC also released a transcript from John McCain's appearance on the "Imus in the Morning" radio program, in which McCain said, "I know that President Bush has a record of honorable service during the Vietnam War in the National Guard, where he also went through pilot training and flew a rather difficult airplane to fly, and did well" (Allen, 2004).

Even though the Bush campaign made a concerted effort to attack these allegations and aggressively defended Bush, Bush, setting a pattern he followed throughout the campaign, did not respond directly to the charges. Instead, he had others do that. Over the days and weeks ahead Republicans continued defending Bush's Guard service and criticizing the Democrats' motives and efforts. Laura Bush, for example, said in an AP interview, "I think it's a political, you know, witch hunt, actually, on the part of the Democrats. He knows he served honorably. He knows that he showed up the whole time." In an ABC interview she said, speaking of McAuliffe, "I don't think it's really fair to lie . . . he made it up" (DeFrank, 2004).

The Bush campaign's response to this issue in February was a precursor for what the campaign would do throughout the campaign in similar situations. The National Guard story hit the campaign again, this time much stronger, in September and dominated campaign coverage for several days. Democrats, some 527 groups, and other outside groups had been questioning whether Bush fulfilled his National Guard commitment and whether he received preferential treatment in even getting into the Guard. These charges reached their apex when CBS' "60 Minutes," using documents CBS had recently obtained, aired a story charging that Bush had not fulfilled his National Guard service. The documents showed that Bush's commander in the Texas Air National Guard grounded Bush when he missed a medical examination and that he did not meet performance reviews. In addition, former Texas lieutenant governor Ben Barnes was interviewed on "60 Minutes" and said he helped Bush get into the National Guard (Railey, 2004).

The Bush campaign did not respond by disputing the specific charges leveled in the "60 Minutes" report but instead continued the mantra they had repeated throughout the year: "If the president had not fulfilled his commitment he would not have been honorably discharged" (Railey, 2004). The Republicans tried to shift the focus by increasing their attacks on Kerry's antiwar protests, including his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the early 1970s about wartime atrocities committed by American troops in Vietnam (VandeHei & Edsall, 2004), and by accusing the Democrats of being behind the National Guard stories. The day after the "60 Minutes" story, for example, McClellan said, "You absolutely are seeing a coordinated attack by John Kerry and his surrogates. The polls show Senator Kerry falling behind, and it's the same old recycled attacks that we've seen every time the president has been up for election" (Keen, 2004).

President Bush let surrogates address his guard service and the "60 Minutes" story, while he continued to talk about what he wanted to talk about. On September 14, for example, he spoke at the National Guard Association's national convention and did not talk about his own Guard service except to say he was one of 19 presidents to serve in the National Guard and that, "I am proud to be one of them" (Nichols, 2004).

The latest twist in the Guard story changed the dynamics of the campaign and provided a brief reprieve for Kerry. The increased attention to Bush's Guard service shifted the focus from Kerry's Vietnam service and antiwar activities and issues the Bush campaign wanted to

talk about. After weeks of attacks and allegations about Kerry's military and antiwar activities, the Democrats clearly relished the turn of events, and it seemed to reinvigorate Kerry supporters (VandeHei & Edsall, 2004).

Unfortunately for the Democrats, almost as soon as the "60 Minutes" story aired, many experts questioned the veracity of the documents that "60 Minutes" had used as the basis of the story. Several days after the story ran and under a constant barrage of criticism, CBS admitted it had made mistakes. Although Terry McAuliffe and others promised to continue to attack Bush's Guard service and argued that official records and other news accounts provided enough evidence to show that Bush had been dishonest about his service in the National Guard, all attacks on Bush's National Guard service were in some ways discredited when the documents that "60 Minutes" had used were proved to be forgeries. Although Democrats continued to attack Bush's Guard service, after the CBS story, stories about Bush's Guard service lacked credibility and lost traction with the public.

Attacks on Kerry's Vietnam Service and Antiwar Activities

In April, the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and the *Los Angeles Times* ran stories on the 33rd anniversary of a weeklong antiwar demonstration that Kerry helped organize as part of Vietnam Veterans Against the War. As part of the demonstration, Kerry, according to his campaign website, "threw away his ribbons and the medals of two veterans who could not attend the event." With the attention that this anniversary caused, Republicans saw an opportunity to focus attention on Kerry's antiwar activities and point out Kerry's inconsistencies in recounting his antiwar actions, such as whether he threw away his medals or someone else's medals and whether he threw away medals or ribbons. Karen Hughes, a key Bush advisor, Dick Cheney, and House Republicans were among those who raised questions about Kerry's protest and throwing away his or someone else's ribbons or medals. Hughes, for example, on CNN's "Late Edition" said, "Now I can understand if, out of conscience, you take a principled stand, and you would decide that you were so opposed to this that you would actually throw your medals. But to pretend to do so – I think that's very revealing" (VandeHei & Allen, 2004).

Although Republicans wanted to use this as an example of Kerry's inconsistencies and his tendency to say different things to please different people, the Republi-

cans were taking a chance by attacking Kerry on this issue because it was giving attention to Kerry's Vietnam service and heroism, a stark contrast with their own candidate. Indeed, David Wade, a Kerry spokesman, said, "We love this fight. We won't be lectured about his honorable service and noble opposition to a war gone wrong from Republican hacks working for a man who can't prove he showed up to do his duty. If they want to compare what the two men were doing in 1971, we will win that character test any day" (VandeHei & Allen, 2004).

When stories about whether or not Kerry had thrown away medals or ribbons and whose he threw away became a campaign issue, initially the Kerry campaign reacted to this controversy the same way the Bush campaign did in such situations, with spokesmen responding quickly and directly to the attack allowing the candidate to stay above the fray. Yet that strategy did not last long. After being "described by aides as fuming" about Republican attacks on his antiwar protests and his service in Vietnam, Kerry responded even stronger than his spokesman had and aggressively attacked Bush. On ABC's "Good Morning America" Kerry said, "This comes from a president who can't even show or prove that he showed up for duty in the National Guard. And I'm not going to stand for it" (VandeHei & Allen, 2004). He concluded the interview thanking Charlie Gibson, the one conducting the interview, "for doing the [dirty] work of the RNC" (Thomas, 2004, p. 56).

Later in the day Kerry said, "I did obviously fight in Vietnam, and I was wounded there, and I served there and was very proud of my service. To have these people, all of whom made a different choice, attack me for it is obviously disturbing" (Nagourney & Wilgoren, 2004).

Kerry told NBC, "When they start questioning what I did or didn't do 35 years ago, or said, on a personal level, I'm going to fight back. If George Bush wants to ask me questions about that through his surrogates, he owes America an explanation about whether or not he showed up for duty in the National Guard. Prove it" (Nagourney & Wilgoren, 2004).

The next day Kerry's campaign escalated its attack on Bush's and Cheney's military service, providing reporters a four-page handout headlined, "Key Unanswered Questions: Bush's Record in the National Guard." That afternoon Kerry said, "I think a lot of veterans are going to be very angry at a president who can't account for his own service in the National Guard – and a vice president who got every deferment in the world and decided he had better things to do – criticizing somebody who fought

for their country and served. I think it's inappropriate" (Wilgoren, 2004a).

Kerry, unlike Bush, was very much involved in publicly defending himself and used the opportunity to attack Bush's Guard service. As Jill Lawrence in *USA Today* wrote, "John Kerry often talks about the lesson he learned from Michael Dukakis, Al Gore and Max Cleland: fight back or lose. The Democratic presidential candidate is following that advice this week by repeatedly raising questions about President Bush's service in the Air National Guard" (Lawrence, 2004).

Perhaps it was a lesson he learned too well, however, or perhaps he learned the wrong lesson. Although Kerry's aides said this debate played to his advantage, it may have instead worked to Bush's. Instead of focusing on the message that had been planned, Kerry and his campaign were sidetracked to respond to Republican allegations. As Jodi Wilgoren (2004a) wrote in the *New York Times*, the "back-and-forth on decades-old military experience overshadowed for a second day the 'Jobs First' bus tour that Mr. Kerry had intended as the kickoff of his general election campaign."

The difference between Bush's and Kerry's responses throughout the campaign were stark and none more so than during this dustup. While Kerry responded to the charges and brought up questions about Bush's Guard service, Bush never allowed himself to be dragged into the debate. It was an issue that Bush purposely avoided in public. For example, in a speech in Minnesota on April 26, the same day Kerry responded so strongly on ABC, NBC, and other outlets, Bush never mentioned Kerry by name nor addressed any of Kerry's charges about Bush's Guard service. Instead, using the tack he used throughout the campaign, Bush purposely stayed above the fray, while having Cheney and other surrogates defend Bush and attack Kerry (Nagourney & Wilgoren, 2004). Kerry's direct involvement in publicly defending himself and also attacking Bush also portended how Kerry would respond to more serious challenges to his record.

Swift Boat Veterans for Truth and Kerry

Swift Boat Veterans for Truth first registered in the campaign, although only briefly, early in May when the group held a news conference where it criticized Kerry's service record and his antiwar comments and activities after he returned from Vietnam. The Kerry campaign immediately responded. David Wade said the statements were "a false, lying smear campaign against a decorated combat

veteran.” “This is the ugly face of the Bush attack machine questioning John Kerry’s patriotism” (Farhi, 2004).

The group did not surface in the mainstream media again until early August when it made a small media buy in three swing states (Ohio, West Virginia, and Wisconsin). The commercial accused Kerry of lying about his war record and betraying fellow soldiers with his antiwar activities. Both the Kerry campaign and the Bush campaign reacted. Steve Schmidt, a Bush campaign spokesman, distanced the Bush campaign from the ads, saying, “The Bush-Cheney campaign has never and will never question John Kerry’s service during Vietnam. The election will not be about the past, it will be about the future.” For its part, the Kerry campaign passed out an 18-page packet tying the group’s financial backers to Republicans and had two of Kerry’s crewmates and a man whose life he saved in Vietnam hold a conference call in which they defended Kerry’s service (Wilgoren, 2004b).

Back in February the Bush campaign had struggled over the best way to react to the National Guard controversy; some in the campaign wanted to aggressively defend the president, while others did not want to dignify the story with a response and in the process bring more attention to the story. This time it was the Kerry campaign that debated over the best way to respond. Bob Shrum, a top Kerry adviser, and Mary Beth Cahill, Kerry’s campaign manager, both wanted to ignore the ads. They believed the ads’ only impact would be on the Republicans who were going to vote for Bush anyway and would not be a factor with undecided voters. They felt that undecided voters did not like negative campaigning, and they feared that Kerry would turn off these voters if he were to strike back. Others in the campaign disagreed, including Mark Mellman, Kerry’s pollster, who saw the ads eroding Kerry’s support in the polls (Thomas, 2004). Many Democrats outside the campaign also criticized Kerry and his campaign for not reacting forcefully enough against these ads and thought Kerry should be stronger in defending himself. Kerry was itching to fight back but was discouraged by his staff from doing so (Thomas, 2004).

For many days the Kerry campaign tried to pressure the Bush campaign to condemn the Swift Boat ads, but the Bush campaign refused. Instead the Bush campaign complemented Kerry’s Vietnam service and criticized all 527s (Rutenberg, 2004a). The Bush campaign continued to do this even after MoveOn.org, on August 16, aired a commercial attacking Bush’s National Guard service and calling on him to take the Swift Boat commercials off the air. Again Bush did not get involved in the fray, but his campaign of course did. Steve Schmidt, a Bush

campaign spokesman, criticized MoveOn.org, defended Bush’s service in the National Guard, and denounced all commercials by 527 groups but again did not specifically denounce the Swift Boat ads (Kurtz, 2004).

The next day Kerry ratcheted up the pressure on Bush to repudiate the Swift Boat ads. Kerry denounced the MoveOn.org ad and called on Bush to do the same with the Swift Boat ads. The Bush campaign responded like it had done before, saying it had no connections to the Swift Boat group and refused to condemn it. Steve Schmidt said, “The campaign has not questioned and will not question John Kerry’s service in Vietnam. The president made clear on national television that he honors John Kerry’s service in Vietnam.” Schmidt also pointed out that on the same day that Kerry repudiated the MoveOn.org commercial, his campaign held a news conference repeating the charge made in the commercial that Bush was able to get into the Guard because of family connections (Rutenberg, 2004b). Schmidt said, “John Kerry condemns the ad on one hand and then his campaign’s surrogates go out and echo the baseless charges that appear in the ad. It’s typical John Kerry: Say one thing, do another” (Simon, 2004).

Finally, to the pleasure of Kerry supporters, Kerry came out swinging August 19: “More than 30 years ago, I learned an important lesson. When you’re under attack, the best thing to do is turn your boat into the attack. Thirty years ago, official Navy reports documented my service in Vietnam and awarded me the Silver Star, the Bronze Star and three Purple Hearts. Thirty years ago, this was the plain truth. It still is. And I still carry the shrapnel in my leg from a wound in Vietnam.” “Of course, the president keeps telling people he would never question my service to our country. Instead, he watches as a Republican-funded attack group does just that. Well, if he wants to have a debate about our service in Vietnam, here is my answer: Bring it on” (Romano & VandeHei, 2004).

Kerry’s strong reaction not only illustrated how deeply the Swift Boat ads had cut away from his poll numbers, but also how personally he took the Swift Boat attacks. The way the Kerry campaign responded to the Swift Boat commercials, however, provided an opportunity for the Bush campaign to criticize Kerry’s hypocrisy in wanting Bush to pull the Swift Boat ads, even though 527 groups had been attacking Bush for months. The Bush campaign also tried to portray Bush as a reformer who wanted all 527 ads eliminated, not just the ones Bush did not like. McClellan said, “There have been a lot of false, negative charges made against the president by these shadowy groups. So if [Kerry] would join us, we

could get rid of all of this unregulated soft money activity” (Healy, 2004c).

McClellan and the Bush campaign continued this line of attack the next day, saying the Swift Boat ad was “another example of the problems with these shadowy groups that are funded by unregulated soft money. And that’s why the president has spoken out against [this] kind of advertising.” He also responded to charges by the Kerry campaign that the Bush campaign was behind the Swift Boat ads, “Senator Kerry, you know, appears to have lost his cool, and now he’s just launching into false and baseless attacks against the president. The Kerry campaign has fueled these very kinds of attacks against the president” (La Ganga, Gold, & Braun, 2004).

Throughout this controversy the Bush campaign consistently complimented Kerry’s Vietnam service and called for the end of all 527s but never specifically condemned the Swift Boat ads. Bush, for example, said, “I think Senator Kerry served admirably, and he ought to be proud of his record.” Asked by reporters whether he would condemn the ad Bush said, “That means that ad and every other ad. I’m denouncing all the stuff” (Romano & Milbank, 2004). A few days later Bush mentioned Senator John McCain was joining him in a lawsuit to stop 527s. “Five twenty-sevens – I think these ought to be outlawed. I think they should have been outlawed a year ago. We have billionaires writing checks, large checks, to influence the outcome of the election.” Bush also expressed sympathy for Kerry being attacked by the Swift Boat ads and in the process pointed out Kerry’s hypocrisy in wanting Bush to repudiate the Swift Boat ads, “I understand how Senator Kerry feels – I’ve been attacked by 527’s too” (Sanger & Bumiller, 2004).

Discussion

We can learn many lessons from how the Bush and Kerry campaigns handled attacks. First of all, not all negative attacks are equal. Both the context of the situation and how the candidates respond to the attacks affect the success of negative campaigning. The charges about Bush receiving favoritism in getting into the National Guard and then not fulfilling his duties once he was in the Guard were potentially just as explosive as the Swift Boat ads. Yet, although the attacks and questions about Bush’s Guard service at times dominated news about the campaign, there are several reasons why it did not enjoy the same traction or have the same effect as the Swift Boat ads. One reason is that Bush had never talked about his National Guard service

or made it a lynch pin in describing his career or making a case for why voters should vote for him. What he may or may not have done 30 years before was not critical except to those who already despised Bush. Relatedly, the stories were not new, and with Bush having served a term as president, Bush was a known quantity. How relevant was a story that happened 30 years before given people’s experience with Bush the previous four years? Moreover, Bush was not the first presidential candidate to have Vietnam troubles. Following the 1992, 1996, and 2000 presidential campaigns, the public was numb to what candidates may or may not have done during the Vietnam War. If Clinton, an alleged draft dodger, could be elected and re-elected, then Bush’s service in the National Guard would not be an important factor in the election.

The National Guard stories also did not have much effect on voters because of the way Bush and his campaign reacted to the allegations. Bush was not himself defensive nor did he allow his campaign to get off message. In fact, Bush did not respond directly to attacks but allowed surrogates to defend him and criticize Kerry. Rather than be distracted from his message like Kerry was wont to do, Bush doggedly stayed on message and did not allow the Democrats to knock him off. Kerry, on the other hand, was too easily influenced by what the Republicans were doing. Kerry took attacks on his Vietnam record personally and wanted to respond personally.

There is little doubt that the Swift Boat ads were an instrumental part of the 2004 campaign. They were effective at dominating the news media’s coverage of the campaign, knocking Kerry off his message, and were a great boon to the Bush cause at a critical time in the campaign. They were effective in large measure, however, because of how Kerry ran his campaign and how he reacted to the Swift Boat ads.

Unlike Bush, Kerry’s image was not as well defined for most of the public when the Swift Boat ads were released. Whereas the American public had almost four years of Bush as president and had a good idea of who he was, for much of the public, Kerry’s image was still being formulated. Moreover, much of Kerry’s campaign had centered on his service and heroics in Vietnam: “Kerry didn’t want to talk about the war. And yet he seemed to talk about it all the time, constantly reminding voters that he (unlike most other politicians, including George W. Bush) had fought for his country” (Thomas, 2004, p. 2). Early in the campaign he decided to hang his hat on his Vietnam experience in order to burnish his foreign policy credentials as well as make a comparison between himself and Bush. As a result, when attacks were made

questioning his valor and his accounts of what went on in Vietnam, the potential for damage was much greater than it was with Bush's National Guard service because they went to the heart of the Kerry campaign.

Kerry also reacted very differently to attacks from how Bush reacted, and his response proved detrimental to his campaign. Although Kerry at times tried not to personally get bogged down in charges and counter charges and allowed others in the campaign to take care of it, Kerry nevertheless frequently injected himself into the maelstrom. Whereas Bush stayed above the turmoil and allowed others to defend him and to levy personal attacks against Kerry, Kerry made himself out to be a victim of the "Republican smear machine" and appealed to Bush to call off the dogs.

Such an attack on an opponent's methods is not necessarily a bad move if the candidate and his campaign are unsullied by having made personal, negative attacks. If so, the candidate can complain about his opponent's campaign tactics and, if seen as being above the fray of such negative campaigning, may be able to succeed in arraying public opinion and the press against his opponent and his opponent's tactics. However, even if a politician's hands are clean of negative campaigning, it may not be worthwhile to criticize his opponent's tactics because the public assumes all politicians are pretty much the same and expect that both campaigns are doing it. And the public is frequently right. Candidates are usually knee deep, if not higher, in mud by the time they begin whining about what their opponent is doing. Thus the charges change from being accurate depictions of his opponent's tactics to complaining about something of which both candidates are guilty. This was the case with Kerry. Kerry ap-

peared hypocritical complaining that the Swift Boat ads had crossed the line when his campaign and 527 groups supportive of his candidacy had engaged in much of the same tactics for most of the year.

Kerry also did not personally respond well to the attacks. He whined too much about what Republicans were saying about him and was often too defensive and sensitive to the attacks against him. He made a mistake that many novice candidates make by taking attacks personally and overreacting to them. Novice candidates are not used to having their character, their business practices, and their personal beliefs in public with the ferocity that often characterizes campaigns. Yet Kerry was not a political neophyte running for office for the first time nor should he have been surprised that Republicans and anti-Kerry groups would aggressively attack him. But he seemed to be. The problem with whining is that it is not a likeable characteristic in children, and neither is it a likeable characteristic in candidates for office, especially those participating in the rough and tumble environment of presidential politics. Not only does whining not look presidential, but it is also a likely sign that things are not going well in the campaign, the candidate is on the defensive, and he is losing ground in the polls. Thus, for a variety of reasons, the candidate who whines the most is the one who is going to lose.

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Seinan Gakuin and Private School Education in Taishō Japan (1912–1926)

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ABSTRACT: *In Taishō era Japan (1912–1926), there were very few middle schools in the entire country. Though education officials in Japan were successful in creating primary schools and had achieved a 96% attendance rate, education ended for all but the elites after six years. As Japan entered the modern era, this weakness could not be allowed to continue. However, the Japanese government did not have the resources to establish thousands of schools they felt were necessary. Therefore, they encouraged the creation of private schools wherever possible. This article chronicles the creation of one such institution—Seinan Gakuin, a private, parochial middle school in Fukuoka, Japan. The establishment of this institution was important for the city of Fukuoka and for Japan because it provided educational opportunities that would otherwise not have been available and because it was later expanded and eventually became one of the finest universities in Japan.*

The education reforms instituted by the Ministry of Education in Meiji-era Japan (1868–1912) were thorough and comprehensive. No public schools existed before 1868, but by 1912 literacy rates in Japan were among the highest in the world and primary school attendance rates reached 96% (Japan Ministry of Education, 1980). By any measure, education officials were extraordinarily successful on the primary level and successful, to varying degrees, at other levels. However, education officials were not content with the progress made at the middle school level and sought out ways to provide additional opportunities for middle school students as Japan moved into the teens and twenties. All Japanese children nationwide were required to attend primary school. But there was no such requirement for children of middle school age. Indeed, many areas struggled to support middle schools and a shortage of facilities existed nationwide. With the encouragement of education officials, private schools emerged to fill the void. This article chronicles the creation of one such institution—Seinan Gakuin, a private, parochial middle school in Fukuoka, Japan. The establishment of this institution was important for the city of Fukuoka and for Japan because it provided educational opportunities that would otherwise not have been available and because it was later expanded and eventually became one of the finest universities in Japan.

The vast majority of students in Japan did not attend middle school in the Taishō era (Japan Ministry of Education, 1980). Indeed, middle school became the point

at which wealthy and ambitious students were distinguished from their peers. Middle schools were the first stop for students being trained for positions of leadership in society. Because financial restraints limited the number of schools each prefecture could support and since attendance was not compulsory, each pupil was charged tuition. Those with the financial means and aptitude could continue, but most could not. In spite of this, the demand for more middle schools grew stronger. During the late Meiji and Taishō eras, the number of middle schools grew exponentially. In 1890, there were 55 middle schools nationwide; in 1912, 313; and in 1925, 502. Despite the increase in the number of schools, they were still only for the elite. Fragmentary evidence suggests that one boy in eight attended and women were only allowed to attend schools for girls (Takenobu, 1929).

In Taishō Japan, there were four different kinds of middle schools: three types of full-time schools and one type of night school. The most common was the *chūgakkō* which was for boys only. It was designed to prepare students to continue in higher education. The school for girls was *kōtō jogakkō*. It trained selected girls to fill their role in society and emphasized domestic duties. Academic standards were lower for girls than for boys. The vocational school was called *jitsugyo gakkō* and “served the primary function of training young people to handle specific technical jobs that required more training than that offered by the elementary and continuation schools” (Supreme Command of the Allied Powers [SCAP], 1948,

p. 71). Night schools helped to continue the education of middle school–age children already working.

Private middle schools constituted a large percentage of newly opened middle schools in the Meiji and Taishō eras. These institutions were highly regulated by the government. Before establishing a school, permission had to be obtained from prefectural and city officials. In the Taishō era, many conditions had to be met. Half the teachers had to possess a government certificate to teach. Two thirds of the teachers had to be employed at one school only. There were to be two teachers for every fifty pupils and no single class could have more than fifty students. Buildings had to meet government specifications. Reading recitation rooms had to be adequately lit by natural light. Dorms had to be built with access to sunlight. Each school had to have a gym, school equipment, and extensive grounds. The Ministry of Education even regulated the location of a campus, though geographic requirements were not made public. Generally, buildings could not be located in an area “where the morals and health of the students would be adversely affected.” Suitable dormitories, agricultural training grounds, and residences for teachers had to be provided. The minimum number of days the school could be in session was 230 and the maximum was 250. Finally, the sponsoring organization had to have the Japanese yen equivalent of \$1,500 US in capital (an amount that today would be approximately \$600,000) in order to obtain government recognition. Obviously, opening a middle school was no mean task (Dozier, 1914).

Many obstacles prevented foreigners from opening middle schools for boys in Japan. Primary among them was latent Japanese mistrust of foreigners, especially foreign Christians. Japanese officials questioned the motives, finances, staying-power, and education qualifications of foreigners. However, American clergy working in Japan felt strongly that education was important to their goals, and in spite of the difficulties, they opened boys’ middle schools all over Japan. For example, the year 1875 witnessed the establishment of the first two boys’ middle schools opened by American Christians. In conjunction with Meiji Gakuin, a school jointly run by the Northern and Southern Presbyterians, as well as American Dutch and German Reformed Church, a boys’ middle school was first established. The other opened in Kyoto under the sponsorship of the Kumiai Kyōkai and later came to be called Dōshisha University. By 1912, there were fifteen Christian boys’ middle schools in Japan. On the island of Kyushu alone, there were four boys’ middle schools directed by American Christians (Dozier, 1953).

No Christian organization in Japan in the early part of the century was as well-funded or staffed as it would have liked. Most, however, had an abundance of well-educated men and women who understood the importance of education. Christian families in Japan, though few in number, had no choice other than to send their children to public primary schools where attendance was mandatory and religious instruction was not allowed. However, as boys approached middle school age, they were given choices of different schools. The opportunity to instruct the children of Christian parents in a Christian environment could not be missed. Even with insufficient funding and personnel, many began the daunting task of establishing boys’ middle schools.

Southern Baptists joined a well-established trend late. Because they were also initially late in sending teams to Japan, they opened their boys’ middle school forty years after many of their co-religionists. There were already nineteen boys’ middle schools in all of Japan and four in Kyushu by the time they began their boys’ middle school (Inglehart, 1916). Southern Baptists traditionally emphasized evangelism and preaching and deemphasized social or medical ministries.

The absence of a boys’ school in 1913 was unacceptable to Southern Baptists working in Japan. Harvey Clarke, on the field since 1898, wrote that, “our dependence upon other denominations to do this training for us has kept us in an embarrassing position for too long. It has classed us among the weaker denominations in Japan, while we are second to none in ability in America” (Parker, 1991, p. 84).

Southern Baptists had sought to open a middle school for several years. As early as 1909, they sent requests to their Board asking for permission and support to establish a boys’ middle school. In the 1910 report to the Southern Baptist Convention they wrote:

Our mission thinks it is high time for us to begin the training of our Christian boys and girls. If we are ever to have Christian character developed in our young people it must be done in Christian schools. If Baptist schools are necessary in America, how much more are they necessary in Japan?

(Southern Baptist Convention [SBC], 1910, p.208–09).

There is no extant record of the Board’s reply. However, because they asked again the following year, they must have been refused. A year later, the English language

night school opened as a short-term education substitute for a boys' middle school.

The 1912 Report to the Southern Convention again emphasized the importance of opening a boys' middle school in Japan. They used a different approach to persuade their Board: money and competition. The Southern Baptist seminary moved to Tokyo and was combined with the Northern Baptist seminary, leaving the facilities in Fukuoka to be used by the English Language night school only and then not very extensively. A portion of the report reads:

A first-class academy for boys in the former Seminary building at Fukuoka is an immediate necessity. We have thousands of dollars invested in this plant which is, except for its use for the night school, lying idle. We have an ideal situation and free field in the most central and important city of Kiushiu [sic]. Other missions would have begun work here but have courteously deferred to us. We cannot play the dog in the manger, and yet to sell out and resign the inestimable advantages we have here would be little short of folly. (SBC, 1912, p. 247–48)

Despite such an eloquent plea, their Board again refused.

They continued to apply pressure to their Board in an attempt to establish a boys' school. They voted to assign John Rowe, who served from 1906 until his death in 1929, the responsibility for forming an academy. He worked in this capacity until his wife Margaret, on leave in America, became so ill that they doubted if they could return to Japan. After Rowe left, C. K. Dozier was assigned the responsibility. Dozier believed that a boys' school was "absolutely essential" (Parker, 1991, p. 84). Dozier periodically corresponded with their Board and convinced the administration in America of the importance of a school.

Beginning in 1914, their Board began asking specific questions about the procedure for opening a boys' school. Dozier asked for \$2,000 to begin the process. They responded with queries about lesser amounts. It is clear from the August 14, 1914 letter that Dozier was well-informed about the difficulties and expenses of establishing a school. He even knew the going salary for teachers was \$15 per month for uncertified instructors and \$50–60 per month for experienced, certified teachers. He responded to their queries in this way: "there is no use to begin a school unless we expect to make it equal in efficiency and reputation to the government schools." It is clear that their Board had neither an idea of the expenses of such a school, nor of the importance of education in Japan. A lesser amount of funding would

not facilitate the establishment of a boys' middle school (Dozier, August 24, 1914).

Meanwhile, Japanese Christians and non-Christian residents of Fukuoka were becoming impatient with the Southern Baptists. Dozier had shared their team's vision of a Southern Baptist middle school with the residents of Fukuoka. There was only one other middle school in the city and non-Christians were therefore also interested in the venture. Nevertheless, their Board could not guarantee the funding. This discouraged both the team and the Japanese Christians in the area. One Japanese is quoted as saying, "Baptists are always behind" (Dozier, August 24, 1914). Undaunted, Dozier and the Southern Baptists continued to press their demands.

In the fall of 1914, their Board began to show interest in the boys' middle school in Fukuoka. They wanted to know the requirements for government recognition. The prerequisites outlined above constituted an impressive list. More importantly, a large number of the requirements had already been met or could easily be met in a short period of time by the team. The old seminary facilities could be used to house the school. Several certified Japanese Baptist teachers had expressed an interest in teaching at a boys' school. What was missing was \$1,500 capital.

In January of 1915, the Board sent a letter to Dozier giving permission to the team to found a boys' school. They sent \$1,600 as capital and promised \$30,000 for buildings. The Board specifically wrote, "the Mission will attempt to finance the school out of the appropriations already made for 1915, without calling upon the Board for any further appropriations for this object." All other expenses were to be covered by the team members themselves if any more were needed (Dozier, December 9, 1914).

The approval letter arrived in January, too late to get permission and open the school in April, the normal start of the new school year. The team voted to postpone the opening until April of 1916. This would allow them ample time to prepare the facilities, hire teachers, advertise for students and give them an entrance examination. The one year delay allowed Dozier to hire qualified teachers and lay the foundation for a fine boys' middle school.

The team voted to hire Inohiko Jo as principal. Jo was a graduate of Kyoto Imperial University and was dean of a government middle school in Kumamoto. Important to the team, he was Baptist and intended to enter the ministry full-time upon retirement from teaching. The Board approved of Principal Jo and thought well of the work of Dozier for suggesting him. Their Board also reminded Dozier to rely on the Japanese as much as possible stat-

ing, “we should work with this in mind always.” Sadly, Jo contracted tuberculosis soon after he assumed the position and was only useful thereafter as a consultant. He resigned in July 1916 (Dozier, August, 3, 1915).

In the fall of 1915, Dozier alone began negotiations with the authorities to get approval for the boys’ school. The process was long, detailed, and arduous and lasted into 1916. The education bureaucracy was so complicated that the team decided to hire a Japanese specialist to help complete the paperwork and to negotiate with the authorities. It took two weeks to make out the itemized list of holdings and requirements the officials needed to begin the application process. Dozier later indicated that the list need not be complete in order to get approval, only that the officials wanted to be sure the team had carefully measured the cost of a school. The only major obstacle they encountered was with the endowment. Private schools were required to use interest from the endowment to cover running expenses. The team only had a promise from their Board to send the money at some later, undetermined date. Since there was only one other middle school in Fukuoka (population 100,000), the authorities were anxious to see the establishment of another. They were thus very trusting and on February 7, gave temporary approval for two years pending the remittance of the \$30,000 by 1917 and the acquisition of more suitable land. A Ministry of Education spokesman wrote, “we would be glad to welcome another school if it would not fold up after a few years” (Dozier, February 9, 1916).

The team decided on a name for the school. It was to be called Seinan Gakuin, (Southwest Academy). There were already Christian schools in selected cities in Japan. One was named Tohoku Gakuin (Northeast Academy) in Sendai, and the other was in Kobe and named Kansai Gakuin. Seinan Gakuin would thus complete the line of Christian schools running from the North East to South West. After the team chose the name, they drew up a monogram and designed uniforms (Dozier, 1953).

The remaining task to be completed was finding students. This was not difficult because hundreds of students were turned away from the government schools yearly. At the middle school in Fukuoka, only 190 of 600 boys who applied were accepted yearly. Seinan Gakuin advertised in the leading newspapers and pasted posters in public places all over Fukuoka. The community response to the school was overwhelming. Hundreds of boys applied. Seinan Gakuin limited the age of prospective students to fifteen years. With this provision in place, the examination was administered to 119 students. The test must not

have been very difficult because 111 boys passed and 109 enrolled. There were eleven teachers, including Dozier. Later, after the opening of the school, others “begged to be let in” (Dozier, April 16, 1916). On one day in late April, over thirty boys were turned away.

The opening exercises for the school were held on April 11, 1916. City and prefectural officials attended and gave speeches. The governor sent a representative. The mayor made a “fine speech.” A brigadier general of the army was present. Administrators from many government schools attended. In all, more than 200 people were present. The team was pleased. However, the risk was great. Failure would mean humiliation and the loss of face for many (Dozier, April 16, 1916).

The school had hardly opened when Dozier began seeking funds to enlarge the facilities. In his letter to their Board announcing the opening of the school, he requested an expanded budget. Seinan Gakuin needed the \$30,000 endowment promised. Dozier, acting in his capacity as treasurer and temporary principal, also requested money to relocate the school. According to the provisions the government officials established for opening the school, the old seminary facilities would be sufficient for two years only. Even at the opening of the school, he complained about the lack of space (Dozier, April 16, 1916).

Seinan Gakuin was costly and continued to incur opening costs. The school asked for \$1,000 more in 1917 than in 1916. The extra money was needed to sustain the school, not enlarge it. Dozier indicated in his August 3, 1916 letter that after adding up the costs, no further budget cuts could be made. When their Board did not produce the one thousand dollars, Dozier became nervous. Dozier had assured the educational authorities that they would move and/or upgrade the present facilities. They needed to purchase land in time to build before the end of the two-year grace period. Dozier’s pleas for the promised funding became impassioned. In every extant letter to the Board for the next few months, he pleaded for the promised monies (Dozier, August 3, 1916).

After many months of searching for a Japanese principal, the trustees elected Dozier as permanent principal of Seinan Gakuin in February of 1917. Four graduates of Imperial Universities had been interviewed for the position. All declined the job. This gave Dozier the title as well as the responsibility of principal.

The promised funding from the Board had not materialized in the first year of Seinan Gakuin’s existence. The community recognized that it might never come. As a result, the number of students that entered the second year

was substantially lower than in 1916. Roughly one third of the students that entered in 1916 had dropped out. With only 75 new students entering, the total enrollment was 143. If new grounds and buildings could not be secured soon, the school would not survive (Dozier, n.d.).

Finally, in 1917, the property where the seminary had been and where Seinan Gakuin had opened its doors the year before was sold for \$13,000. Also, a special plea for funding Seinan Gakuin was issued at the Southern Baptist Convention in New Orleans. Money that was collected from this meeting was applied directly to moving needs. The Convention managed to raise \$6,000. With this money, combined with the money from the sale of the old seminary property, the team bought five acres of land just on the outskirts of Fukuoka in the “New West” section. They moved several of the old buildings to the new property and erected a new building. In January 1918, classes met in the new facilities. No mention is made about the disruption of classes. Ironically, walled defenses built to repel the Mongol invasions in the thirteenth century were discovered on this property. Now foreigners owned the land (Parker, 1991).

The team eagerly sought to get government recognition for the school. Without it, the school would not grow and would never become a first-rate institution. Since recognition was contingent upon meeting most of the requirements previously listed, Dozier began the process of acquiring needed lab equipment and teachers who could instruct students in the use of them. This was the last remaining barrier to government recognition.

In the meantime, only a small group of new students entered the school in April of 1918. Including the new boys, only 174 attended the school. Getting government recognition proved difficult because lab equipment continually became more expensive due to inflation. The government raised teachers’ salaries. In order to keep up, Seinan Gakuin also had to raise salaries. The increases were substantial. The salaries of teachers who earned less than ¥30 per month were raised 20% and teachers who earned ¥30–60 were raised 15%. As Dozier related to T. B. Ray, “the cost of living was very much higher than two years ago” (Dozier, July 27, 1918). Financial struggles continued.

There is no extant record of how the team or the Board found the needed funding; nevertheless, the lab equipment was secured before the new school year began. As a result, the entering class of 1919 was very much larger and of better quality than all the years except 1916. Ninety students were admitted. This made for a total of 250 pupils attending Seinan Gakuin. Very soon after the

start of the school year, the Ministry of Education recognized the school, and Seinan Gakuin’s future was secured (Dozier, March 14, 1919).

Securing government recognition gave many advantages to graduates of Seinan Gakuin. Three of the most important were the postponement of military service for pupils, qualification for entering government service after graduation, and the privilege of taking higher government school exams. For teachers and administrators, recognition meant raising the entrance requirements and through that, becoming a more prestigious institution (Dozier, n.d.).

Seinan Gakuin College

No sooner had Seinan Gakuin secured government recognition for the middle school than Dozier began dreaming of opening a college department. The Japanese phrase *senmon gakkō* was most often translated in the Taishō era as “college.” These were specialty schools and most closely resembled American junior colleges. The course of study was three years. According to government ordinance, these institutions were to teach science and art of a higher order. They were also to stress personal character and general development. For most students, *senmon gakkō* were to be the last schools attended before entering the work force (SCAP, 1948).

In 1920, there were 100 *senmon gakkō* in Japan. In 10 years time that number would double to nearly 200. About half were private institutions, one third were government institutions, and the rest were controlled by cities or prefectures. These schools were designed to train skilled workers for industry. Many graduates would become technicians, plant managers, and junior engineers; others would go into commerce. Still others would become para-professionals in the fields of medicine or agriculture. Some colleges taught liberal arts, but most did not. Those that taught liberal arts were preparatory schools for the Imperial universities. Since enrollment in *senmon gakkō* was about three or four times greater than the Imperial universities, most students ended their studies there (SCAP, 1948).

Fewer Christian organizations operating in Japan had opened colleges than had opened middle schools or kindergartens. In spite of fewer regulations imposed on private schools at the college level, there were only seven Christian colleges in Japan in 1920. Aoyama Gakuin was the first to be opened in 1883 by the Evangelical Association, the Nihon Methodist Kyowai (both associa-

tions of unnamed Methodists), and another Methodist organization. The second was opened in Sendai at the Tohoku Gakuin in 1892 by the German Reformed Church of the United States. During the post-World War I expansion, Southern Baptists were to open their own (Inglehart, 1920).

Southern Baptists were quite happy with the hard-won success of Seinan Gakuin middle school. In 1919, plans for opening a college were some time in the distant future. Events beyond its control however, pushed Southern Baptists to consider a college department more quickly. The impetus for this acceleration was the threat of competition from another group of American Christians. In Japan during the early part of twentieth century, there was an understanding among American Christian organizations to respect the territory of other Protestant organizations. Indeed, there was a high degree of cooperation between most of these groups. However, American Methodists decided to open a higher school (college) in cooperation with at least one other Christian group in Fukuoka. Of course, the Southern Baptists were incensed by this breach of comity. The Unionists, as they were called, assumed that the Southern Baptists would surely support this venture. When they did not, and in fact actively fought it, the Unionists appealed directly to the upper administration of the Southern Baptists. They, too, instead of cooperating, were so offended by the arrogance of the letter that they became even more vehemently opposed to the opening of another school. T. B. Ray wrote on December 24, 1919,

Mr. Scott's [a representative of the Union School] manner is rather a condescending one in dealing with the enterprise you represent. He does not face the real [section illegible] and bases his argument upon the fact that they have a number of academies that will supply students to their Union School. The presumption is that you will not have students, even though you should found your High School [college] in Fukuoka and therefore, they would be justified in coming in. (Ray, December 24, 1919)

Immediately, Dozier opened a dialogue with the educational authorities concerning establishing a college. The Unionists had already been in contact with the educational authorities. Instead of the warm reception and encouragement he found when he began the process of opening Seinan Gakuin, the authorities suggested that he join the Unionists. The Mayor of Fukuoka said there was no need for two such schools. Nevertheless, in July of

1920, Southern Baptists voted to add a college and seminary department to Seinan Gakuin (Dozier, n.d.).

Five acres of land adjacent to the middle school grounds were purchased. Before building could commence on the college, Seinan Gakuin had to secure government permission. Not even one pine tree could be cut down without this. In order to get permission, the team had to have a \$40,000 endowment. On this occasion, the Board was able to allocate the funds. On February 17, 1921 the Ministry of Education granted permission to Seinan Gakuin to open the college department. This came with no time to spare. The first class of middle school students was to graduate in March. Only 28 out of an original class of 109 in 1916 graduated. Thirteen Seinan middle school graduates joined 17 others to form a freshmen class of 30 students (Dozier, November, 3, 1920).

Seinan Gakuin College had two departments: the School of Literature and the School of Commerce. The course of study was to be four years. Those who entered the School of Literature were preparing to enter the Seminary that was to open in 1923. For the first time in Seinan Gakuin's history, Dozier was not leading the school. He left for the United States in June of 1919 (SBC, 1922).

This study of the establishment of Seinan Gakuin reveals several interesting glimpses into Taishō era education and Southern Baptist goals. Southern Baptists sought to open a boys' middle school for two major reasons. Traditional forms of evangelism were not effective in Japan. Because of this, Christians in Japan could not find people willing to listen to their message. One way they could find people who would listen was to give them something they wanted: education. Another reason, and perhaps more important, was the need to prepare young Japanese men for the ministry. This was the primary reason given to Southern Baptists for opening a boys' middle school. They were in the right place at the right time to open a middle school because the community needed one.

In 1916, the state of education in Fukuoka was very poor. Only a minute percentage of the middle school-age boys had the opportunity to attend school. Before Seinan Gakuin opened, only 190 boys in a city with a population of 100,000 entered the government school annually. This was an extremely low figure. It is certainly understandable then that city officials would allow foreigners to educate their children, even though most Japanese officials thought the guidance of boys' education was of foremost importance to the future of the nation and should be led by Japanese alone. Despite official misgivings, the city was desperate.

The Southern Baptists were not just interested in establishing a school; they sought to establish a superior school. Although the Taishō period was relatively free of the suspicion of foreigners that marked the Tokugawa period (1600–1868) and some years of the Meiji period, most Japanese still did not embrace Christian ideals. American Christians working in Japan wanted a degree of respect and prestige they did not enjoy. One way to realize this was to build a first-rate institution that the community could not help but admire.

As Seinan Gakuin was struggling to attract students for the first years of its existence, it could not be very selective about the level of students admitted. Indeed, it admitted most students that showed even a small degree of promise. However, as it became clear that Seinan Gakuin would not soon close and after it received government recognition, it became more selective and usually admitted a smaller percentage but a larger number of students of those who applied. Table 1 gives more specific details.

By being more selective about admitting students, securing government recognition, buying new land, and building new and very impressive facilities, Seinan Gakuin came to have a superior reputation in the community.

Southern Baptists also sought to impress their Board regarding the quality of students at Seinan Gakuin. It is clear from the correspondence that they believed their Board would be pleased with the school if the best students attended. Dozier wrote in several of his letters that the quality of students would rise if Seinan Gakuin received the funding to build new facilities, secured government recognition, or had a better faculty. The graduation rate of the first class bore out Dozier's argument. Only 28 of 105 students endured to graduate five years later.

A natural outcome of developing a good reputation was the alienation of poor and less talented individuals. The Ministry of Education, city officials, the Board, the team working in Fukuoka, parents of students and prospective students, and Dozier all wanted a superior middle school in the city. In addition, people are most comfortable associating with those with whom they can identify. All male Southern Baptist missionaries not only had graduated from college, but also seminary. They were highly educated for their time and often came from middle class families. Designing a ministry directed at middle to upper-middle class students was thus natural to them. The Gospel applied to all, however. It was unfortunate that the poor were excluded from this most important ministry, yet Southern Baptist education mirrored the Japanese education system of the time.

Table 1. Percentage of Students Admitted by Year

Year	Number of		Percent
	Exam Takers	Students	
1916	119	105	93
1917	NA	75	NA
1919	NA	90	NA
1920	158	94	59
1921	320	120	36
1922	317	148	47
1923	270	91	34

There is some question about the ability to proselytize even within the confines of Seinan Gakuin. The government sought to control as much of the curriculum as possible and in an 1899 announcement, prohibited religious instruction during school hours for any government school and government-recognized school. Christians all over Japan did not take this seriously and continued to ignore the rule. The Ministry of Education became aware of this and in 1916, forbade religious instruction in any school building. In order to overcome this restriction, many schools built chapels just off school property and strongly suggested their students attend. This was all but required in most Christian educational institutions (Ion, 1993).

The rules applied to Southern Baptists as well. While the documents do not explicitly say that a chapel needed to be built beside the campus, implicit evidence does exist. Shortly after Seinan Gakuin moved to its present location and was awarded government recognition, Dozier wrote requesting funds for a chapel. This circumvented regulations, but it also kept their Board and the team happy and therefore allowed for the continuation of the school.

The best evidence of how well the school was received in Fukuoka was the promptness of government permission to open the school. While the process was detailed and lengthy, when all the requirements were met, the team opened the school. Also, because the city was so desperate, they even waived several regulations. At the opening ceremony for the school in 1916, many officials and dignitaries were present. By their attendance, they were sanctioning a Christian school.

Finally, the best way to gauge the impact of the school on Fukuoka is to look at the alumni roles. Some of the graduates of the first few years proved highly successful in the academic, religious, and business worlds. In 1925,

Sadamoto Kawano finished his course of study and eventually returned to become President of Seinan Gakuin. That same year Seizo Inoue graduated and later became a pioneer broadcast engineer and local historian. The following year, Kosaku Kase finished, became a successful businessman and eventually became President of Seinan Jo Gakuin (the women's school opened a few years later). The successes of early graduates were many and varied. Some others became newspaper publishers, professors, authors, wealthy businessmen, and theologians. A 1934 graduate, Masayuki Nagatsuka, even became the deputy mayor of Fukuoka. Most of the early graduates, however, became clergy. Several became President/General Secre-

tary of the Japan Baptist Convention. Many more well-trained clergy must have labored in relative anonymity (Seinan Gakuin Daigaku Dosokokai, 1992).

The Southern Baptists set out to establish a first-rate institution, to prepare men for the Ministry, and to train Christian men to contribute to the development of Fukuoka and Northern Kyushu. In this, Dozier's dream became a reality.

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